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Abstract 
The success of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations revealed the political viability 
and economic importance of global trade liberalization. Although subsequent multilateral 
negotiations have been less successful, many countries aim to further liberalize trade, often by 
negotiating regional free trade agreements. The further development of existing quantitative tools 
for economic impact assessment of trade policies, thus, seems as relevant as ever. This thesis 
improves the representation of trade policy instruments in global applied equilibrium models (AEM) 
reflecting on recent improvements in numerical algorithms and computational power, better 
statistical information at global scale and unresolved theoretical challenges. Regarding the ex-ante 
availability of trade negotiation details, we look at two extremes. First we consider that highly 
detailed information is available and use tariff line level data to extend existing AEMs. On the other 
extreme, we assess future trade agreements without such detailed information. Lacking detailed 
policy input data, we use broader negotiation objectives to design an exploratory policy analysis with 
a typical, large-scale AEM. Even if based on imprecise assumptions, such impact assessments still can 
provide crucial input for policy making. More so as trade policies interact with other areas of 
international cooperation, such as global efforts to combat climate change; interplays which have 
received increased public and scientific attention. 
For both extremes of policy data availability, methodological improvements to AEMs are proposed. 
Assuming fully detailed information, a tariff aggregation method is developed that is consistent in 
terms of simulated welfare-implications while remaining invariant to geographical details on 
exporting countries. Consistent tariff aggregation eliminates the aggregation bias, but only in terms 
of one selected model outcome. To increase precision in more than one simulated impacts we also 
look for multi-purpose alternatives to consistent aggregation. Two multi-purpose aggregation 
approaches are presented with a focus on correcting for the following biases: (i) the substitution 
effect at the tariff line; (ii) the imperfect transmission of tariff cuts to domestic import prices (water 
in tariffs) and (iii) the interdependency of tariff rates and imported quantities under Tariff Rate 
Quota regimes. Concerning a lack of detail on (future) trade policies, we explore the contribution of 
the current EU trade agenda to global greenhouse gas mitigation efforts for agriculture. The agri-
food sector is both a major emitter of non-CO2 gases and characterized by a higher level of border 
protection. In that setup, a simulation exercise with a large-scale partial equilibrium model (CAPRI) 
reveals potentially significant emission leakage impacts, and thus trade liberalization negatively 
contributes to unilateral emission mitigation efforts.  
The thesis thus includes several empirical examples, demonstrating that the proposed 
improvements for trade policy modelling can be implemented in current, even large-scale, modelling 
systems, and they significantly improve simulation results. We also highlight some future challenges 
related to the assessment of trade agreements in a wider policy context such as within the trade-
climate change nexus. 
Keywords: tariff aggregation, trade liberalization, Tariff Rate Quota, trade and climate change nexus, 
greenhouse gas emissions, emission leakage, CAPRI 
  
 iv 
Kurzfassung 
Der Erfolg der Uruguay-Runde verdeutlichte, dass globale Handelsliberalisierung politisch 
realisierbar und ökonomisch bedeutend sein kann. Nachfolgende Verhandlungen innerhalb der 
Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) waren zwar weniger erfolgreich, aber viele Länder streben nach 
weiterer Handelsliberalisierung, häufig durch regionale Freihandelsabkommen. Deshalb ist die 
Weiterentwicklung von quantitativen Methoden und Modellen zur wirtschaftlichen 
Folgenabschätzung von Handelspolitiken weiterhin relevant. Ziel dieser Dissertation ist die 
Verbesserung der Modellierung handelspolitischer Maßnahmen in globalen angewandten 
Gleichgewichtmodellen (AEM), unter Berücksichtigung aktueller Entwicklungen in numerischen 
Analyseverfahren und Rechenleistungen, besseren internationalen statistischen Informationen und 
ungelösten theoretischen Herausforderungen. Bezüglich der Vorabverfügbarkeit von Informationen 
zu Handelsabkommen werden zwei Gegensätze betrachtet. Wenn detaillierte Informationen 
verfügbar sind benutzen wir Daten auf Zolltarifpositionsebene um AEMs zu erweitern. Anschließend 
bewerten wir zukünftige Handelsabkommen bei denen diese Details nicht verfügbar sind. Anstatt 
detaillierte vorhandene Daten verwenden wir hierfür allgemeine Verhandlungsziele um eine Analyse 
mit einem typischen allgemeinen AEM zu gestalten. Selbst wenn sie auf unpräzisen Annahmen 
beruhen, können solche Analysen wichtige Beiträge für die Politikgestaltung liefern, insbesondere da 
Handelspolitiken sich auch auf andere Bereiche der internationalen Zusammenarbeit auswirken, wie 
zum Beispiel die globalen Anstrengungen zur Bekämpfung des Klimawandels. 
Für beide Gegensätze der Datenverfügbarkeit werden in dieser Dissertation methodische 
Verbesserungen für AEMs vorgeschlagen. Zunächst wird eine Zollaggregationsmethode entwickelt 
die konsistent bezüglich der simulierten Wohlfahrtsauswirkungen und gleichzeitig invariant zu 
geographischen Details der Ausfuhrländer ist. Konsistente Zollaggregation verhindert 
Aggregationsverzerrungen, allerdings nur für eine ausgewählte Modellergebnisvariable. Um die 
Genauigkeit der simulierten Ergebnisse bei mehreren Variablen gleichzeitig zu verbessern werden 
auch Mehrzweckalternativen zur konsistenten Zollaggregation untersucht. Zwei 
Aggregationsmethoden werden getestet mit dem Ziel die folgenden Verzerrungen zu verringern: (i) 
der Substitutionseffekt auf Ebene der Zolltarifpositionen; (ii) die imperfekte Transmission der 
Tariffsenkungen auf inländische Importpreise und (iii) die gegenseitige Abhängigkeit zwischen 
Importzöllen und Einfuhrmengen unter Zollquoten. Bezüglich Handelspolitikbewertung im 
erweiterten politischen Kontext analysieren wir den Beitrag der aktuellen EU Handelspolitikagenda 
zu den internationalen Bemühungen bei der Verringerung landwirtschaftlicher 
Treibhausgasemissionen. Simulationen mit dem partiellen Gleichgewichtsmodel CAPRI zeigen 
erhebliche Emissionsverlagerungen durch die geplanten Handelsabkommen, d.h. unilaterale 
Verringerungen von EU Treibhausgasemissionen könnten auf globaler Ebene untergraben werden. 
Diese Dissertation enthält mehrere empirische Beispiele die aufzeigen, dass die vorgeschlagenen 
Verbesserungen zur Modellierung von Handelspolitiken in existierende Modellierungssysteme 
implementiert werden können und zu deutlich verbesserten Simulationsergebnissen führen. Zudem 
werden einige zukünftige Herausforderungen der Handelspolitikanalyse in einem erweiterten 
politischen Zusammenhang, wie zum Beispiel im Rahmen des Welthandel-Klimawandel Nexus, 
hervorgehoben.  
Schlusselwörter: Zollaggregation, Handelsliberalisierung, Zollquoten, Welthandel-Klimawandel 
Nexus, Treibhausgasemissionen, Emissionsverlagerungen, CAPRI  
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Chapter 1: Introduction and overview of the thesis 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Implementing border protection policies, such as tariffs, quantitative restrictions or other non-tariff 
measures, requires a certain level of aggregation in contemporary applied equilibrium models (AEM) 
of international trade. Different data availability on trade flows and tariffs versus supply and 
consumption is one reason that forces practitioners to aggregate. Trade statistics and current trade 
policy instruments (including the outcome of trade negotiations, such as tariff schedules) typically 
are available, or even defined, at the detailed level of tariff lines (Guimbard et al., 2012), while 
statistics on supply and consumption are only available for more aggregated commodities. Technical 
limitations on computational power and numerical algorithms also force modellers to build 
aggregate databases for their AEMs, both geographically and commodity-wise.
The last decade has brought a rapid development in trade modelling, both by relaxing computational 
limitations and with the availability of ever more detailed trade statistics at the global scale. The 
straightforward way for better exploiting the possibilities these trends offer would be to extend 
trade models to the tariff line, and to avoid aggregation as much as possible. There are indeed some 
attempts in the literature pushing the computational limits towards more geographical and product-
wise disaggregation. (Grant et al., 2007) extends a rather aggregated Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) model with a satellite partial equilibrium (PE) model working at the tariff line for 
dairy products. (Narayanan et al., 2010) opt for a fully nested approach for extending a CGE model to 
include commodities at tariff line level for the impact assessment of the tariff liberalization for the 
Indian auto industry. (Britz and van der Mensbrugghe, 2016) advocates advanced database filtering 
and improved numerical algorithms to avoid, or at least significantly reduce, pre-model aggregation. 
These examples, however, still offer only partial solutions, as they either do not cover all modelled 
sectors and regions or they still do not disaggregate the model to tariff lines. Thus practitioners are 
confronted day to day with the choice of an appropriate tariff aggregation method that fits both 
their modelling tools and the objective of their modelling exercise. 
Trade modellers borrowed the first ideas for tariff aggregation in their models from the literature of 
measuring trade protection and restrictiveness. Tariff aggregation was, and often currently is, done 
by applying weighted averages over the tariff lines, with weights typically related to traded volumes. 
It was quickly recognized that trade weighted averages are subject to the endogeneity bias, i.e. trade 
in those goods facing high tariffs  tends to be low, resulting in small weights and thus in 
systematically underestimated aggregate measure of tariff protection (c.f. Pelikan and Brockmeier, 
2008). To decrease the bias, trade modellers started using different weighting schemes and even a 
combination of weighting methods.  
Following the classification of(Cipollina and Salvatici, 2008), weighted averages fall into the category 
of a-theoretic measures of trade restrictiveness, lacking the links to economic theory. In the early 
nineties, (Anderson and Neary, 1994) started a new branch in the literature for measuring trade 
protection with the introduction of the so-called consistent measures, and they pioneered tariff 
aggregation methods consistent with a selected measure of economic activity. The first of such a 
measure, the Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI), measured tariff protection and policy restrictions in 
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terms of their impact on the home country's welfare, mapping the deadweight loss associated to 
border policy instruments in to and index number. As consistent measures were applied to evaluate 
multilateral trade liberalization proposals at the global scale, and as welfare impacts are not always 
good predictors for countries' bargaining strategies, a set of consistent aggregators have been later 
developed focusing on other economic variables too. The Mercantilist Trade Restrictiveness Index 
(MTRI), for example, measures trade protection in terms of its impact on traded volumes, rather 
than on domestic welfare. 
The TRI can be interpreted as a uniform ad valorem tariff rate that provokes the same welfare 
impact as the individual tariff line rates. Unfortunately, that uniform tariff rate is not suitable for 
AEMs, as only one aggregate tariff cannot resolve the tension between the simultaneous marginal 
impact of tariff changes on tariff revenues and on consumer expenditures. (Bach and Martin, 2001) 
tackle this problem first, by defining separate aggregators for the expenditure and the tariff revenue 
functions. (Anderson, 2009) further simplifies and completes their approach by adding an optimal 
combination of a trade weighted aggregator and a consistent aggregator to the trade balance 
condition of the general equilibrium framework. 
Apart from the endogeneity bias, another side-effect of conventional aggregation methods on 
simulated welfare and trade impacts, which is less explored in the current literature, is that these 
simulated impacts can be systematically increased by adding more regional detail to the AEMs 
database. (Ko and Britz, 2013) demonstrate the systematic bias of geographical aggregation on 
simulated results in the specific case of modelling the EU-South Korea free trade agreement (FTA) 
with a CGE model. In Chapter 2 of this thesis we have a closer look at their findings and we 
successfully extend state-of-the-art tariff aggregation techniques to correct for the systemic bias: we 
develop a welfare-consistent aggregation approach that is invariant to increasing geographical detail 
for exporter countries. 
Consistent aggregators eliminate aggregation bias in terms of one selected variable, but that does 
not hold for all simulation outcomes. In fact consistent aggregators might increase the bias in other 
simulated model outcomes. A welfare consistent aggregator for a tariff reduction, for example, 
might eliminate aggregation bias in welfare impacts, but can, at the same time, increase aggregation 
bias in simulated traded volumes. Therefore consistent aggregation methods cannot serve as 
general-purpose alternatives to a-theoretic trade weighted methods; a reason while the latter 
approaches are still prevalent in current practice. 
In order to develop multi-purpose alternatives to conventional aggregation, we explore in Chapter 3 
methodological techniques that borrow ideas from consistent aggregation and apply model- 
endogenously determined (variable) aggregation weights. Still these techniques do not aim at full 
consistency with respect to any model variables, but instead they aim at addressing three sources of 
aggregation bias on a wider range of simulated impacts: substitution effect at the tariff line, water in 
tariffs and variable tariff rates under Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ) regimes. 
We put an emphasis on proposing aggregation techniques that do not require significant changes in 
existing model structures, and can be implemented as pre-model satellite modules for large-scale 
AEMs. That property is a serious advantage in practice while changing database or equation 
structure for large-scale models might require serious human resources. 
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After improving tariff aggregation for trade policies that are known in detail, the second part of the 
thesis deals with the assessment of future trade policies or those being currently under negotiation. 
What makes modelling future trade agreements challenging is that the fine details of the deal are 
effectively unknown during the negotiation process, and thus trade modellers are forced to design 
their scenarios following broader negotiating mandates or even more loosely defined negotiation 
objectives of the parties. In Chapter 4, therefore, we move from exploiting the fine details of tariff 
line data in AEMs to a more general and more aggregated approach for trade modelling. As trade 
policies do not operate in isolation, but interact with other policy efforts too, modelling exercises 
with less specific trade policy assumptions but with strong links to other policy areas can provide 
insights into policy interactions; and are therefore well justified. In this thesis we focus on the 
interplay of trade and environmental policies, and we empirically assess the effect of the current EU 
trade agenda (including FTAs currently negotiated or to be started by the EU) on global greenhouse 
gas (GHG) mitigation efforts in agriculture. International trade is an important factor in defining the 
global impact of any local GHG mitigation effort. Emission reduction in one country or region might 
be partially or totally offset globally by increasing emissions in other parts of the world. Whether 
emission leakage (i.e. domestic emission savings offset by increased emissions in other parts of the 
world) increases or decreases due to a trade deal is mainly determined by the relative emission 
efficiency of the trading partners. GHG mitigation efforts of relatively emission efficient regions 
(such as the EU) are specifically jeopardized by emission leakage, if those efforts are done 
unilaterally, without comprehensive multilateral agreements for limiting leakage. As international 
trade is the transmitter of emission changes to trading partners and to other third countries, the 
representation of trade policies in AEMs is also crucial for improving simulated environmental 
impacts of GHG-reduction policies.  
Agriculture is a major emitter of non-CO2 (nitrous oxide and methane) gases (Henning et al., 2006) 
but policies directly limiting agricultural GHGs are still relatively rare. In the EU, for example, 
agriculture is not part of the Emission Trading System (ETS). Agricultural mitigation efforts are rather 
driven by the EU Energy and Climate Framework, which sets economy-wide reduction targets for the 
member states. Member states have then flexibility to set specific targets to their agriculture sector. 
An EU-wide GHG-reduction policy for agriculture is not (yet) in the policy discussion. The Paris 
agreement might become a game changer in this respect, in case firmer commitments imply a need 
for increased contribution from agriculture to combat global warming. The Commission's concept on 
the future of food and farm (European Commission, 2017) already calls for an increased ambition for 
the agriculture to contribute to climate change mitigation efforts, and sets bolstering climate 
mitigation efforts as one of the main objectives of the future Common Agricultural Policy. The future 
implementation of ambitious nationally determined contributions (NDC) to the Paris Agreement, 
and reaching reduction targets more efficiently, might require direct mitigation policies in EU 
agriculture.  
In Chapter 4 we assess such a direct emission mitigation policy in the form of a hypothetical EU-wide 
carbon tax for agriculture. Our focus is not primarily on the efficiency of the carbon tax in reducing 
agricultural GHG emissions, but rather the international context. More precisely, we investigate 
whether the ambitious trade liberalization agenda in which the EU is currently engaged, could 
contribute to GHG mitigation efforts. The Juncker Commission put further trade liberalization as one 
of its top priorities to boost economic growth and job creation (European Union 2018). But trade 
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liberalization might also magnify emission leakage effects, depending on relative emission 
efficiencies of the EU main trading partners and on the structure of EU agri-food trade. 
With the mean of a comparative static simulation exercise with the CAPRI model we provide some 
empirical evidence that the trade liberalization agenda leads to significant emission leakage effects 
and partially offsets globally the emission reduction gains of an EU-wide carbon tax in agriculture. 
That result hinges on the key assumptions that the EU agriculture is relatively emission efficient, and 
that the introduction of the carbon tax does not happen in the context of a multilateral emission 
reduction effort, but rather done unilaterally. That simulation results allow us to formulate some 
policy recommendations on improving the efficiency of possible future GHG mitigation policies in 
the EU agriculture. 
As the fine details of the EU's future trade agreements are yet unknown, we opt for a simplified 
trade policy representation in our scenarios. Trade policy instruments (including specific tariffs, 
TRQs, entry price system) are converted into an equivalent ad-valorem tariff rate, representing the 
initial price wedges between import prices at the border and those faced by domestic consumers. 
Although some details of the EU policies are lost with the ad-valorem equivalent representation, this 
simplification allows for defining rather general trade liberalization assumptions on future tariff cuts 
that are still of uncertain magnitude. To address the uncertainty in future FTAs of the EU, we also 
perform a sensitivity analysis regarding the EU's ambition on trade opening.  The robustness of the 
simulated results is tested against more and less ambitious trade liberalization options for the FTA 
partners. The sensitivity analysis confirms that the main drivers of the simulated emission changes in 
the EU agriculture are invariant to different level of trade liberalization assumptions. 
1.2 From research objective to contributions to literature 
In the following section we formulate the main research objectives of the thesis, and introduce the 
methodological approaches we applied to tackle them. We highlight the methodological advances 
and empirical contributions to the literature which are further discussed in detail in the remaining 
chapters. 
1.2.1 Flexible and welfare-consistent aggregation over exporters 
(Ko and Britz, 2013) draw attention to a specific aggregation bias which is less explored in current 
literature. They pose the research question whether regional aggregation matters for CGE modelling, 
and give straight ahead a positive answer. Their paper highlights that simulated trade liberalization 
impacts systematically increase with more geographical detail (representing the EU with its member 
states rather than as one aggregate region in this case) in the context of the EU-South Korea FTA. In 
this thesis we go one step further and demonstrate that although the above bias indeed exists for 
conventional aggregation methods, it is possible to construct a welfare-consistent aggregation that 
fully eliminates it, at least for simulated welfare impacts. We construct such an aggregator by 
extending the (Anderson, 2009) framework for consistent trade policy aggregation in the general 
equilibrium framework. Caveats certainly apply for the use of the proposed aggregation in practical 
trade modelling, including limitations on the demand system (separable homotheticity), the small 
country assumption (i.e. changes in import demand have no impact on world prices) or that the 
supply of domestically produced goods does not influence domestic consumer prices. We further 
discuss the implications of these limitations in the subsequent sections. 
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The (Anderson, 2009) framework builds on the balance of trade condition which guarantees that the 
value of imports in the economy  is equal to the value of exports plus a possible financial inflow :b  
 , , , ) (( , , ) ( , ) ( ) 0.
w w w w
pB p E p E Eu p u p p b           (1.1) 
Above the trade expenditure function 𝐸() is defined as the difference between the consumers’ 
expenditure function and the gross domestic product (GDP) function: 
 , ) ( , , ) (, , )(E e pp u u g p     
where (𝑝, 𝜋) denotes the domestic price vector, partitioned to a part to be aggregated (𝑝) and to 
another one that is not (𝜋). 𝑢 denotes real income. The Shephard‘s and Hotelling’s Lemmas allow 
for deriving the excess demand function directly from the expenditure function: 
p p pE e g   and 
E e g     (the subscripts denote partial derivatives).  Consistent aggregation requires 
restrictions both on the supply and demand sides of the economy. We assume (weakly) separable 
demand for the product group with price vector p  and assume that the group enters the 
consumers' utility function homothetically. Separable homotheticity implies two-stage budgeting 
(Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980), and allows the formulation of price indexes over product groups at 
the top level of the consumers’ budget allocation problem. Assuming that domestic prices are 
wedged away from fix world prices 𝑝 = (1 + 𝑇)?̅?𝑤 by a tariff vector 𝑇, and with the fix utility 
assumption, one can construct a tariff aggregator for the expenditure part as an implicit function of 
domestic prices: 
,: | ( ( ), , , ) ( , , , ).,n w w w wE p u p E p u p        (1.2) 
(Anderson, 2009) builds on the above implicit function and combines two tariff aggregators in an 
aggregated version of the balance of trade condition of equation (1.1): 
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Note that the above equation already refers to aggregated commodity categories. Anderson coins 
𝑇𝛿 the True Average Tariff, introduced as the aggregated price wedge relative to the aggregate 
domestic price: 
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The second aggregator 𝑇𝑎 in the optimal combination is a simple trade weighted average tariff. 
In Chapter 2 we extend the above framework by introducing a regional dimension for the exporter 
(partner) countries. We first define exporter-specific implicit functions analogue to equation (1.2): 
1 1( , ): | (( ( )) , ( ,, , ) , ),
n m n
n i
n
iE p u uE p    
   
In general, no unique solution exists for the above equation. By exploiting separable homotheticity, 
however, we develop a sequential numerical method to derive exporter-specific versions of 
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Anderson's True Average Tariff and we demonstrate how to combine them in an extended version of 
the standard balance of trade condition in equation (1.3): 
1
1
( ) (
, , ( ) 0.
1
)( )
, ,
1 1i
w ww
wian
i
in i
E T E E b
T T
pp
u
T
p
   
 
  
 
     
   
   
Being able to derive the aggregators in a sequential numerical algorithm, i.e. region after region, is a 
crucial for reducing the difficulties of the practical implementation of extended aggregation 
framework. The aggregation can be implemented in a pre-model aggregation module, loosely 
attached to existing large-scale models. In Chapter 3 we demonstrate how to implement that 
sequential numerical approach in practice, by developing a pre-model aggregation module for the 
CAPRI modelling system. With that aggregation module we calculate exporter specific aggregate 
tariffs for Swiss beef imports directly from tariff line level data. 
Although (Anderson, 2009) discusses how to apply his framework for quantitative restrictions (e.g. 
import quotas), the aggregation framework, to the best of our knowledge, has not yet been 
extended in the literature to explicitly deal with TRQs. TRQs are two-tiered tariff measures, where 
imports are subject to a lower in-quota tariff rate until imports reach a pre-defined threshold. Above 
that quota level a higher out-of-quota tariff rate applies. A further contribution to the literature in 
Chapter 2 is the extension of the Anderson framework to deal with variable tariff rates under TRQ 
regimes. We introduce explicit TRQ functions at the tariff line level, which link applied tariff rates to 
imported quantities.  
TRQs do not only pose a challenge for modelling due to the interlinkage between tariff rates and 
imported quantities. Allowing for different allocation of quota rents between importers and 
exporters further complicates the extension of the above optimal combination of tariff aggregators. 
In Chapter 2 we define a combination of not less than seven tariff aggregators in a modified balance 
of trade condition to aggregate both tariffs and TRQs in a welfare consistent manner.  
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  (1.4) 
The aggregator qT  in equation (1.4) is a correction term calculated over the quota threshold: 
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The tariff aggregators are related to the tariff revenues and economic rents accrued to importer or 
exporters, and can be directly matched with the areas depicted on Figure 1.1, namely: 
   ˆ , , ,a R qA A B B T T T     , ,ˆ ˆ,a corr R corrC T T  and    ,ˆ .a prefD D T  
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Figure 1.1: Quota rents and tariff revenues under TRQ, small country case with an overfilled quota 
assumption 
 
We give further insight in the empirical implementation of the above aggregation method in Chapter 
2 by constructing a small equilibrium model for the South-Korean dairy market. The empirical model 
includes a nested demand structure over 21 HS6 tariff lines, representing the EU as trade partner 
both with its member states and also as one regional entity. In a comparative static simulation 
exercise we demonstrate that our proposed aggregation method indeed eliminates the bias related 
to increased geographical details for the partner countries. Simulation results are also systematically 
compared to other, conventional, aggregation methods. 
1.2.2 Multi-purpose tariff aggregators 
The aggregation method developed in the previous section is only consistent in terms of simulated 
welfare impacts. The question arises, how much we can sacrifice from full consistency to correct for, 
or at least improve on typical aggregation biases for a wider range of model variables. Would it be 
possible to develop aggregation techniques that are, at the same time, cheap to implement in 
existing models and do not require substantial changes in model structures?  
In Chapter 3 we propose two multi-purpose aggregation approaches which are not consistent, unlike 
the previously presented Anderson framework, but which have potential advantages for applied 
trade modelling. The proposed approaches improve simulation results in terms of three typical 
aggregation biases, and with respect to a wider range of model variables, including bilateral trade 
flows and import prices.  
They can also be implemented as pre-model aggregation modules, loosely attached to existing 
models, without the need for modifying model structures. There is even a room for shifting parts of 
the policy representation (i.e. TRQ equations) from the core model to the proposed aggregation 
modules, thereby further reducing the complexity (and computation requirements) of existing 
models. 
Both proposed aggregation methods mimic substitution on the demand side via CES demand 
systems, but following different approaches. The trade expenditure (TE) aggregator is conceptually 
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identical to the True Average Tariff introduced in the previous section, and is based on a full, nested 
CES demand system at tariff line level. The Tariff Reduction Impact Model for Agriculture (TRIMAG) 
aggregator, on the other hand, is a trade-weighted aggregator, but adjusts the aggregation weights 
according to stylized demand reactions depicted by CES share- and price index equations. 
Regarding the aggregation biases we first focus on the substitution effect at the tariff line, an issue 
linked to the heterogeneity of commodity groups. Trade liberalization often leads to demand side 
adjustments and altered composition of imported commodity group as import prices of (including 
the tariff content) might change to different extents. Fix relative import shares within commodity 
groups is therefore an often too restrictive assumption. The size of the bias crucially depends on the 
elasticity of substitution within the group and on the relative price changes. Commodity groups with 
large tariff dispersion or encompassing relatively homogenous goods are subject to a bigger possible 
bias. 
The second source of aggregation bias originates in the imperfect transmission of tariff cuts to 
domestic import prices. We refer to the part of the applied tariff rate that needs to be eroded before 
tariff cuts start to have impact on domestic price as the “water” in tariffs. This is somewhat different 
from the standard binding overhang definition in literature, which is the difference between bound 
and applied rates (e.g. (Bchir et al., 2006)). Both definitions of tariff "water" refer to the buffer that 
countries have in trade negotiations, i.e. they can lower bound tariffs without impacting current 
applied tariffs and thus their domestic prices. Conventional tariff aggregation techniques are based 
on price wedges and they calculate domestic prices simply by adding applied tariffs on top of world 
prices. In Chapter 3 we highlight the importance of the “water” in tariffs in tariff aggregation, and we 
provide an appropriate methodology taking advantage of a detailed database for Swiss domestic 
prices for beef products.  
The third bias we cover is related to the model-endogenous determination of tariffs under TRQ. 
Conventional aggregation does not take into account that tariff rates change depending on the 
quota fill rate, which can lead to both an over or underestimation of the applied tariff rate. As a 
substantial proportion of agricultural production in developed countries is protected by TRQs (see 
for example de Gorter and Kliauga, 2006), the TRQ issue is especially relevant for agri-food markets, 
and therefore for the ex-ante impact assessment of trade liberalization scenarios on agriculture.  
The two aggregators we propose deal with the above three aggregation biases to different extent, 
and following different approaches. For comparison reasons, we also implement and test a 
traditional (fixed weight) aggregator representing conventional approaches. In Table 1.1 we 
summarize the main features of the tariff aggregators discussed in Chapter 3. 
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Table 1.1: Properties of tariff aggregators in respect to selected aggregation biases  
  
Traditional (fixed 
weight) aggregators 
Trade Expenditure (TE) 
aggregator 
TRIMAG aggregator 
Substitution effect 
at the tariff line level 
Not taken into 
account 
via CES import demand 
system 
via CES demand system for 
aggregation weights 
Water in tariffs 
Not taken into 
account 
Not taken into account 
Explicitly taken into 
account using a specific 
dataset on domestic and 
c.i.f. prices 
Tariff Rate Quotas 
(TRQs) 
via tariff equivalent; 
fix applied rate 
via tariff equivalent; 
variable applied rate 
with explicit TRQ 
functions 
Via TRQ function at 
aggregate level; calculates 
both aggregated in quota 
and out of quota rates 
 
We assess the capabilities of the two proposed aggregators by analyzing Swiss tariff dismantling 
scenarios for beef imports. We follow a two-stage, comparative static approach that is typical in 
applied trade modelling ((Francois et al., 2005), (Philippidis and Sanjuán, 2007),(Egger et al., 2015)). 
Both the TE and TRIMAG aggregators are implemented as pre-model aggregation modules in the 
same large-scale global PE modelling framework of the Common Agricultural Policy Regionalized 
Impact (CAPRI) model (Britz and Witzke, 2015), which renders systematic direct comparison 
possible. Assuming different tariff dismantling scenarios for the EU beef exports to Switzerland, both 
pre- and post-reform aggregated tariffs are calculated with the TE and TRIMAG approaches. In order 
to evaluate the performance of the proposed aggregators in policy impact assessment, the 
aggregated tariffs are plugged into CAPRI and the economic impacts of the liberalization scenarios 
are simulated. 
A more precise illustration of the modelling approach is presented on Figure 1.2. First current 
aggregated tariffs are calculated for CAPRI with the proposed aggregation modules: a single ad 
valorem equivalent tariff in the TE aggregator versus both in-quota and out-of-quota tariff rates in 
TRIMAG. Those tariffs then enter the calibration process of CAPRI that creates a baseline scenario 
which serves as the benchmark in the comparative analysis. Aggregated tariffs are also calculated for 
the trade liberalization scenarios, again with both proposed approaches. The aggregated tariffs 
(after liberalization) are then used in the CAPRI simulation providing the simulated impacts on trade 
(market balances and prices) and welfare at the aggregated commodity level for the different policy 
scenarios.  
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Figure 1.2: Extended modelling approach with pre-model tariff aggregation modules 
 
The simulation results confirm the standard finding in literature that traditional (fixed weight) 
aggregators tend to lead to biased estimates for the gains from trade liberalization, both in terms of 
the impact on trade flows and welfare (Anderson, 2009,Laborde et al., 2017). We systematically 
compare simulated welfare and trade impacts derived both with traditional aggregation and with 
the proposed approaches. Systematic differences in the simulation results shed light on the 
importance of the investigated aggregation biases: substitution effects, "water" in the tariff lines and 
the variable tariff rates under TRQ regimes.  
We complement the literature by finding that the difference between the fixed weight aggregator 
and those proposed to correct for important aggregation biases is particularly large when trade 
liberalization scenarios introduce large variation in tariff cuts. We therefore provide further 
empirical evidence that the use of fixed weight aggregators is not recommended in case of large 
heterogeneity (tariff dispersion) in tariffs structures. This is not only true when the variability of the 
initial tariffs is high, as already reported in the literature (e.g. (Laborde et al., 2017)), but also in case 
trade liberalization is expected to increase tariff dispersion to a large extent. 
1.2.3 The interplay of trade and emission-mitigation policies 
A large body of literature discusses emission leakage effects of unilateral greenhouse gas mitigation 
efforts, pointing to potentially significant impacts (e.g. Lee et al. 2007; Herrero et al. 2016; Pérez 
Dominguez et al. 2012, 2016; Van Doorslaer et al. 2015; Fellmann et al. 2017). Whether trade 
liberalization of agri-food markets potentially contributes to emission mitigation efforts or rather 
hinders it, is mainly an empirical question. Theoretical considerations alone cannot provide a 
decisive answer. The theoretical framework of environmental effects of trade-liberalization 
(Grossman and Krueger 1991) breaks down trade liberalization impacts on GHG emissions to (1) the 
scale effect, i.e. liberalized trade boosts total supply and consumption, thus ceteris paribus 
increasing global GHG emissions; (2) the composition effect, i.e. facilitating trade also changes the 
composition of the goods produced and consumed, with a net effect on global emissions depending 
on the relative emission efficiencies of the economic sectors; and (3) the technique effect, i.e. 
liberalizing trade speeds up technological development and technology transfer unequivocally 
leading to more emission-efficient technologies and therefore to a reduction in global emissions. The 
total net impact of trade liberalization on GHG mitigation depends on the relative weight of the 
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above three components and therefore requires a thorough quantitative assessment. Existing 
empirical evidence on the net impact is controversial and reported between between two extremes: 
(i) trade liberalization and globalization leads to environmental degradation, especially in developing 
countries, and (ii) more liberalized trade leads to increased economic growth with positive spill-over 
effects on the environment (Copeland and Taylor 2004; Wiedmann et al. 2007; Peters and Hertwich 
2008; Huang et al. 2011; Peters et al. 2011). The mixed existing empirical evidence on the net 
aggregated effect of trade on global emissions hints towards the case specificity of impacts. 
In Chapter 4 we provide some empirical evidence on the contribution of trade liberalization to global 
greenhouse gas mitigation efforts in the context of the EU agriculture. With the mean of a 
comparative static analysis with the CAPRI modelling system, we investigate the interplay of the 
current EU trade agenda and a hypothetic EU-wide carbon tax for agriculture. Our aim is to highlight 
the challenges that the global context pose to EU mitigation efforts, and draw policy 
recommendations for more efficient future policy design which allows for increased contribution of 
agriculture to limiting global warming. At the same time, the potentially strong interrelationship 
between trade and emission mitigation policies further motivates our research for reviewing trade 
policy representations in AEMs. 
The EU is actively seeking to engage in a number of regional FTAs with its important trading 
partners, as an alternative to the multilateral WTO negotiations that seem to be stalled in the last 
few years. The political driving force behind that strategy seems to be the objectives of the Juncker 
Commission and the attempts to boost economic growth with increasing trade. We focus on those 
EU trade deals that are already under negotiation or likely to be negotiated in the mid-term 
(Boulanger et al., 2016): (i) two recently concluded but not yet adapted FTAs with Canada and 
Vietnam; (ii) major ongoing trade negotiations with the USA, the Mercosur countries, Japan, 
Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia; (iii) two FTAs with Australia and New-Zealand, which are to 
be initiated at the time of writing this thesis. 
As concluded tariff schedules are not yet available for most of the FTAs we consider, we apply a 
simplified approach for trade policy representation. We introduce a uniform, and rather ambitious, 
tariff cut on agri-food products: full elimination of tariffs for most (non-sensitive) agricultural 
commodities and a 50% (partial) tariff cut for the rest of the products. The selection of sensitive 
products follows the approach of Boulanger et al. (2016), and it is based on expert judgment 
supplemented by a selection algorithm focusing on foregone tariff revenues. 
For the analysis, we use the CAPRI (Common Agricultural Policy Regional Impact Analysis) modelling 
system (Britz and Witzke 2014). The standard CAPRI model version includes explicit Tariff Rate Quota 
(TRQ) functions. In order to implement our simplified tariff cut assumptions, however, we covnert 
TRQs into their ad-valorem equivalent (AVE) tariff rates. Representing TRQs with their AVE 
equivalent tariff rates enables us to simply cut them by a given percentage, without going into 
assumptions on possible quota expansions or changes in in-quota or out-of-quota tariff rates. The 
drawback of the simplified AVE representation is that simulated trade liberalization impacts might 
be overestimated. Even if increasing imports overshoot the quota threshold, this does not imply an 
immediate increase in tariff rates in the model (Himics and Britz 2016).  
With regard to GHG accounting, CAPRI model-endogenously calculates agricultural GHG emissions 
for nitrous oxide and methane. The calculation of emissions, however, follows different approaches 
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for the EU and for non-EU countries. While the emissions of EU agriculture are calculated directly 
based on the IPCC guidelines on a per activity basis in the CAPRI supply model, GHG emissions for 
the rest of the world are estimated on a commodity basis (i.e. per kg of product) in the market 
model of CAPRI. The emission calculation for the EU countries and regions is linked to the inputs and 
outputs of agricultural production activities, following the IPCC guidelines (IPCC 2006). Several 
specific technological (i.e. technical and management-based) GHG mitigation options for EU 
agriculture are considered, focusing on technological options that are already available or will likely 
be available at the simulation year 2030. Even if some technological options are already in use in EU 
agriculture (e.g. precision farming) there is a large potential to cover a larger part of EU farming 
activities (Table 1.2). 
Non-EU emission intensities are based on historic emission inventories and production data from 
FAOSTAT. To incorporate also the possibility of emission intensity changes over time, trend functions 
are estimated for the emission intensities in the rest of the world using IPCC Tier 1 coefficients as 
prior information within a robust Bayesian estimation framework, combining data on production 
quantities and emission inventories from FAOSTAT (Jansson et al. 2010, 2014; Pérez Domínguez et 
al. 2016). 
Table 1.2: Technological GHG mitigation options available for adoption by EU farmers 
Sector Technological mitigation options 
Livestock 
Anaerobic digestion at farm scale, Low nitrogen feed, Linseed as feed additive, Nitrate 
as feed additive, Vaccination against methanogenic bacteria in the rumen, and specific 
breeding programs to increase (i) milk yields of dairy cows and (ii) ruminant feed 
efficiency 
Crops 
Precision farming, Variable Rate Technology, Better timing of fertilization, Nitrification 
inhibitors, Rice measures, Fallowing histosols (organic soils), Increasing legume share 
on temporary grassland 
 
In a comparative static analysis with CAPRI we compare three policy scenarios to a business as usual 
scenario (Reference): (i) a scenario that assumes an ambitious EU trade agenda to be fulfilled by 
2030 (FTA scenario), (ii) a scenario for EU agriculture where a carbon tax of 50 EUR/t CO2 equivalents 
is applied to non-CO2 (i.e. methane and nitrous oxide) emissions of EU agricultural activities (EU 
Carbon Tax scenario), and (iii) a combination of the two. The three scenarios aim to break down the 
combined economic and environmental impacts of a simultaneous trade liberalization and emission 
reduction policy, and shed some light on the policy interactions. 
One of our key results is that the EU trade liberalization agenda is likely to increase significantly the 
emission leakage effects. While emission leakage can already be observed in the EU Carbon Tax 
scenario (21%), combining it with trade liberalization further increases the leakage effect to 50% 
(Figure Figure 1.3). That significant leakage effect is due to the EU supply adjustment and the related 
increase of EU imports from relatively less emission-efficient countries. The sectoral and regional 
impacts are further analysed in Chapter 4.  
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Figure 1.3: EU emission mitigation and leakage as percentage of gross mitigation 
 
As main policy recommendation we call the attention to the importance of cross negotiating FTAs 
with the design of National Determined Contributions (NDCs) to the Paris Agreement, assuring that 
mitigation efforts are not undermined in sectors where trade is expected to increase the most. Not 
going into a political economy discussion, taking into account global climate change objectives in FTA 
negotiations can be done in multiple ways. For example, depending on the relative emission 
efficiency in production systems, mitigation efforts in the FTA partners could be partly co-funded. 
There are also several border adjustment processes proposed in the literature to adjust for the 
carbon-load (and thus the differences in relative emission efficiencies) of agricultural commodity 
trade. 
The agricultural sector is specifically subject to a multitude of sanitary and food safety regulations 
that often act as non-tariff barriers (NTMs) to trade. Most of the EU's current trade negotiations 
address NTMs with the aim of reducing them significantly. Although NTMs, and their potential 
reduction, might have significant impacts on the simulation results, we could not include them in our 
analysis, lacking an adequate database at the global scale with a detailed coverage of agri-food 
trade. In addition, Armington trade models, such as CAPRI, are not able to simulate emerging trade 
flows which flows are currently only marginal but which could become significant after trade 
liberalization. Both the absence of NTMs and the zero trade flow issue in our modelling framework 
imply a possible underestimation of the trade liberalization impacts (Philippidis et al., 2013, 2014). 
On the other hand, modelling the EU's trade agenda in isolation probably leads to an overestimation 
of the efficiency of EU trade liberalization, as countervailing regional FTAs, or a future WTO 
agreement would likely lower the EU gains from this liberalized trade agenda. It is therefore unclear 
whether our simulation results reflect somewhat magnified or underestimated trade liberalization 
impacts. 
1.3 Conclusions and prospects for further research 
This thesis revisits trade policy representations in applied trade modelling ranging from the fine level 
of details entailed in tariff line level data until more aggregated and more schematic policy 
representations often used for forward looking exploratory policy analysis. We start our 
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investigation with the question, originally posed by (Ko and Britz, 2013), whether the geographic 
detail of trade and trade policy representation in AEMs induce a systematic bias in simulated trade 
liberalization impacts.  Here we do not simply find further evidence that such a bias exists, but we 
develop a welfare consistent method that is invariant to that bias, i.e. invariant to the geographical 
details regarding the exporter countries. In other words, we show how to collapse disaggregated 
model structures to more aggregated ones without altering the simulated welfare impacts. On the 
way to develop our aggregation framework we make further contributions to the literature by 
integrating TRQs in the welfare-consistent aggregation framework of (Bach and Martin, 2001) and 
(Anderson, 2009), and by critically accessing the assumption of fix domestic supply applied by these 
authors. 
The proposed welfare consistent aggregation is illustrated and tested by developing a PE model for 
the South-Korean dairy market and simulating the EU-South Korea FTA with that model. The 
simulation results highlight an important issue related to consistent aggregators: they do not 
necessarily reduce aggregation bias in all key simulated outcomes of economic analysis. On the 
contrary, the bias typically increases (can we support it with examples from the paper?). Therefore 
we turn our research focus in Chapter 3 towards developing multi-purpose aggregators, i.e. 
aggregators that improve on a multitude of common aggregation biases, such as substitution effects 
in imported consumption bundles at the tariff line, "water" in tariffs and model-endogenous tariff 
rates under TRQ regimes. Our multi-purpose aggregation framework borrows ideas from the 
consistent aggregator literature and introduces explicitly modelled import demand systems (of the 
CES form) into the calculation of aggregated tariff rates. Either using an implicit function approach 
for the aggregator function (as in the case of the proposed TE aggregator), or adjusting aggregation 
weights in a more traditional weighted approach (TRIMAG).  
The proposed improvements for tariff aggregation in Chapter 2 and 3 require, and make use of, 
detailed information on trade policies and trade statistics at the fine level of tariff lines1. For future 
trade policies, e.g. those that are currently negotiated, such a detail is not available for trade 
modellers.  Therefore we move from modelling very specific policy scenarios with AEMs extended to 
the tariff line to applying simpler policy representations based on ad-valorem equivalent tariff rates. 
That latter approach is more suitable for assessing the impacts of still uncertain trade agreements 
due to the data limitations. More precisely we focus on the research field dealing with the impacts 
of future trade policies on global GHG mitigation efforts in agriculture. Complementing a large body 
of literature on the impact of FTAs on global climate change mitigation, we find empirical evidence 
that the EU's current trade agenda might jeopardize future climate action in EU agriculture. That 
finding is mainly driven by the significant simulated emission leakage impacts, and hinges on the key 
assumptions that the EU's climate mitigation efforts are unilateral (not embedded in a coordinated 
global effort for reducing agricultural emissions), the EU farming sector is relatively emission 
efficient and that other FTAs excluding the EU do not countervail the trade implications of the EU 
trade agenda. That empirical finding further motivates the need for improved and tailor-made trade 
policy representation in AEMs, as trade policy representation has a crucial impact on simulated 
emission leakage impacts which might become major impediments of global greenhouse-gas 
mitigation policies in agriculture. As long as trade policies have significant impacts on international 
                                                          
1
 In the empirical examples of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, data at the 6 and 8 digit levels of the Harmonized 
System of tariff nomenclature are used. 
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trade (the transmitter of emission leakage effects between countries), improving trade modelling 
will also improve the assessment of emission mitigation efforts at the global scale.  
 Tariff and Tariff Rate Quota aggregation is an overarching issue in the thesis, with a focus on the 
aggregation bias in several simulation outcomes of AEMs. The tariff aggregation techniques we 
develop and present in the thesis are always adjusted to the specific needs of the policy analysis at 
hand, and we put an emphasis on illustrating the aggregation techniques by empirical examples. 
Regarding the practical implementation of the proposed methodological approaches in existing 
trade models, we aim at methodological approaches which can be implemented even in large-scale 
numerical simulation models with relatively low efforts, not increasing significantly the complexity of 
existing model structures and databases. All trade policy representation approaches in the thesis, 
including both the tariff line level aggregation methods and the more general ad-valorem 
representation, can therefore be implemented as pre-model aggregation modules, loosely linked to 
existing models. The pre-model implementation decreases the necessary efforts for practitioners to 
adopt the proposed (improved) policy representations in their modelling systems. In that sense the 
thesis provides practical implementation schemes for trade modellers to extend their existing 
models with limited efforts and make better use of detailed tariff and trade information at the tariff 
line level. 
After the Uruguay Round of negotiations and a number of subsequent regional trade agreements 
significantly lowered tariff protection globally, modern FTAs focus less on tariff reductions and more 
on non-tariff measures (NTM). The regional extension of the Anderson aggregation framework, 
described in Chapter 2, can in theory applied also to NTMs, as far as those NTMs can be reasonably 
well modelled as additional trade costs2. The extension of our aggregation approach to NTMs is one 
possible avenue for further research. Unfortunately, data availability seriously limits the practical 
extension of our tariff line level approaches to cover NTMs. Despite the current efforts to develop 
harmonized and global databases for NTMs (e.g. UNCTAD 2017), a global NTM database of use for 
practical trade modelling at the tariff line is still unavailable. Building such databases would also 
require a tremendous econometric estimation work, probably based on the new developments and 
current efforts in the gravity model literature (see e.g. Cadot and Gourdon, 2016; Kee et al., 2011, 
2009; Niu et al., 2018). 
Both the proposed welfare consistent aggregator of Chapter 2 and the multipurpose aggregators of 
Chapter 3 are tested in the partial equilibrium setting, imposing certain limitations on (within 
economy) monetary transfers, income effects in the import demand systems, the lack of cross-
sectoral impacts etc. Further empirical assessment and methodological adjustments are needed to 
explore the performance of the proposed aggregators in a general equilibrium setup and in more 
complex model structures, such as Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models of the whole 
economy. The scope of the scenarios we used for testing the proposed tariff aggregators are 
somewhat limited in scope, and focus on one specific sector at a time (dairy sector in case of the EU-
South Korea FTA and on the beef sector in the Swiss tariff dismantling scenarios). Increasing the 
complexity of the scenarios and evaluate cross-sectoral effects therefore seems a natural direction 
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 Modelling NTMs as additional trade costs (e.g. representing them by additional tariffs at the border) is only 
one of many possibilities. In CGE modelling practice NTMs are often modelled using sand-in-the-wheel 
(productivity-based) or other supply side techniques. The appropriate choice of the modelling approach 
depends both on the fine details of the NTM measure itself as well as on data availability.   
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for further improving the proposed aggregation approaches. An area for possible further research is 
therefore testing the proposed tariff aggregators in CGE models and for scenarios covering global 
trade reforms. Evaluating the possible reduction in the aggregation bias in simulated results would 
fit the strand of literature testing advanced tariff aggregation in CGE models (e.g. Laborde et al., 
2017). 
In Chapter 4 we highlighted the potentially significant emission leakage impacts linked to the EU 
trade liberalization agenda. The simulated impacts, however, crucially depend on the relative 
emission efficiency of the EU and its trading partners. The emission efficiency of the agriculture in 
non-EU countries are represented by emission coefficients in our modelling approach, based on a 
commodity based emission accounting, and taking into account past trends for the emissions of 
agricultural sectors. Still, improving the estimation of those emission coefficients, and developing 
scenarios on possible future adjustments in emission coefficients worldwide, is an important area for 
future research. That would allow us to better assess the role of technological development for 
restricting emission leakage and for limiting global warming. 
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Chapter 2: Flexible and welfare-consistent tariff aggregation over 
exporter regions3 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we improve on existing tariff aggregation techniques in applied equilibrium models 
(AEM) with the aim of correcting for two sources of bias in simulated welfare results: (1) aggregation 
over exporter regions with significant tariff dispersion and (2) variable tariff rates determined by 
Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ) regimes. Both aspects seem important due to an increasing number of 
bilateral FTAs which drive up tariff divergence across countries and tend to apply TRQs, at least 
temporarily. We demonstrate that the proposed aggregation technique can handle both tariff and 
non-tariff barriers to trade by combining a number of tariff indexes in a modified trade balance 
condition in a welfare-consistent manner. Additionally, different rent-allocation shares for TRQs can 
be easily introduced in our methodological extension. We also address the implications of some 
rather strict behavioral assumptions with regard to demand that welfare consistent aggregation 
requires. An empirical analysis of the Korean dairy market in the EU-South Korea FTA using the 
proposed method shows that simulated welfare gains are largely affected by the tariff aggregation 
technique over regions and trade policy instruments. Based on this finding we recommend the more 
widespread application of welfare consistent tariff aggregation in applied modeling and further 
research on that topic. 
Keywords: tariff aggregation; welfare consistent aggregation; flexible regional aggregation; Tariff 
Rate Quotas; EU-South Korea FTA; trade policy 
JEL classification: F13, D58, Q17
                                                          
3
 This chapter has been published as Himics, M., Britz, W. (2016). Flexible and welfare-consistent tariff 
aggregation over exporter regions. Economic Modelling 53, 375–387. doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2015.10.024 
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2.1 Introduction 
Data on trade flows and tariffs are typically available at the detailed level of tariff lines (Guimbard et 
al., 2012), but not on supply and consumption. Aggregating trade flows and tariffs is therefore 
inevitable in empirical models of international trade. The still widely used trade weighted average 
tariffs are however not grounded in economic theory and suffer from endogeneity bias as higher 
tariffs decrease imports and thus aggregation weights. As a result, they systematically underestimate 
tariff protection at aggregate level, cf. Pelikan and Brockmeier (2008). Less known and only recently 
explored, however, is that simulated impacts with AEMs can be magnified simply by more regional 
detail. Subsequent chapters show that conventional tariff aggregation cannot consistently handle 
tariff dispersion over exporter countries, provoking that magnifying effect. We hence propose an 
alternative (flexible) aggregation technique that is both invariant to the geographical details of 
exporter countries and fully corrects for the associated bias.  
The current practice of aggregating and using trade and policy data in AEM typically consists of three 
steps. The first one aggregates to the level of a standard set of (already highly aggregated) 
commodities, while regional detail is (almost) maintained, e.g. the widely used GTAP 8 database 
(Narayanan et al., 2012) comprises 57 sectors. The resulting bi-lateral datasets – in the case of the 
GTAP Version 8 comprising about 1.2 Mio trade flows and related policy instruments – are then 
distributed to the end users. In a second step, users aggregate these data further, including trade 
flows and tariffs, to arrive at their desired sectoral and regional detail, typically with aggregation 
tools specific to and distributed with the database. In the final step, the aggregated data are used in 
an equilibrium model to simulate scenario impacts. Unfortunately, the conventional aggregation 
methods have an unwanted side-effect on simulated welfare and trade impacts: these can be 
increased simply by choosing more regional detail (Ko and Britz, 2013). This paper thus aims at 
developing an aggregation method that is invariant to the geographical detail chosen for exporting 
countries. 
Anderson and Neary (1994) pioneered tariff aggregation methods consistent with a selected 
measure of economic activity. Their Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI), for example, is a 
compensating variation measure of welfare changes defined over the country’s balance of trade 
(Martin, 1997). The TRI can be converted into a uniform ad valorem tariff rate that provokes the 
same welfare impact as the individual tariff line rates. 
Unfortunately, one uniform tariff rate is not suitable in the general equilibrium framework as just 
one aggregator cannot resolve the tension between the marginal impact of tariff changes on tariff 
revenues and consumer expenditures. Bach and Martin (2001) therefore define separate 
aggregators for the expenditure and the tariff revenue function. Anderson (2009) simplifies their 
approach by plugging in an optimal combination of a trade weighted aggregator and what he calls 
the True Average Tariff (TAT) into the trade balance condition such that the computation does not 
require a complete equilibrium model at the tariff line level. Section 2.2.1 provides a review of that 
strand of literature.  
Other approaches represent trade policies at the tariff line level and thus avoid tariff aggregation 
completely, but require model extensions. Grant et al. (2007) link a satellite partial equilibrium (PE) 
model of the global dairy markets at the tariff line level iteratively to the general equilibrium (GE) 
structure of Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP, Hertel 1992). Also in the GTAP framework, 
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Narayanan et al. (2010) investigates the impact of tariff liberalization on the Indian auto industry 
with a nested PE-GE approach. Unfortunately, neither the nested PE-GE approach nor the iterative 
model link scale up well, i.e. it is numerically difficult to extend them to all commodity markets or 
industries covered by the aggregate model. 
Brockmeier and Bektasoglu (2014) compare the bias in simulation results caused by aggregation to 
those implied by different model structures (PE or GE framework) in linked modeling systems and 
find greater bias due to aggregation. Accordingly, McCleery and DePaolis (2014) see sectoral detail 
as highly important when building a trade model, but note that data availability typically prevents 
the desired level of disaggregation. Therefore the improvement of available tools for regional and 
sectoral aggregation, what this paper aims for, is of great relevance for applied research. 
Our extension of the Anderson approach, which enables aggregating trade policies consistently over 
exporter regions, seems especially relevant for analyzing preferential and regional trade agreements 
(see section 2.2.2). In contrast, previous applications of tariff aggregates focused on overall trade 
restrictiveness in the face of unilateral (Anderson, 2009) or multilateral trade liberalization (Bureau 
and Salvatici, 2004, Manole and Martin, 2005 or Laborde et al. 2011). Our extended approach allows 
for flexible regional aggregation where so far aggregation tools such as GTAPAgg for global Social 
Accounting Matrices (Horridge, 2008) or TASTE for tariff data bases (Horridge and Laborde, 2008) 
apply trade weighted averages subject to potential inconsistent welfare results. 
Furthermore, we show in section 2.2.3 how to include based on a Mixed Complementarity Problem 
(Rutherford, 1995) approach the per unit quota rent of (bilateral) TRQs via a shadow tariff in the 
aggregation framework. Despite that fact that Anderson (2009) already discussed the techniques to 
handle import quotas, his optimal combination of tariff aggregators has not yet been adapted in the 
literature to a case where TRQs are explicitly modeled. 
Finally, we aim at making welfare consistent tariff aggregation more accessible to policy analysts and 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) modelers. In order to do so, we present the technique in the 
context of those import demand systems typically available in larger-scale AEMs. To give an applied 
perspective to the theoretical framework, the numerical example of Bach and Martin (2001, page 
630-632) is replicated and further extended in section 2.3.1. We point out to a series of implicit 
assumptions in the Bach and Martin paper that have serious impacts on the aggregated tariffs. Some 
of these assumptions are later relaxed or modified in order to derive more intuitive simulation 
response in trade liberalization scenarios. 
In section 2.3.2 we apply the extended approach to the more complex example of the Korean dairy 
market under the EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA), with both tariff reductions and TRQ 
expansions. Tariff aggregators are estimated and compared for Korean dairy imports from the EU at 
different stages of the FTA implementation and geographical resolutions for the EU. These estimates 
are specific to the main European exporter countries of dairy products to Korea. Section 2.4 
concludes with a short summary and with some general remarks on using these tariff aggregators in 
applied modeling work.  
We refrain from a full-fledged large-scale modeling exercise. Instead, we keep our focus solely on 
the aggregation issue and define the scope of our empirical model strictly within the framework of 
an import demand system that is shared across the AEM community and use as a common tool for 
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tariff aggregation. We believe that restricting the discussion to a smaller part of larger modeling 
systems and their application is a worthwhile simplification and helps disentangle the impacts of 
regional aggregation from the numerous (but here non-relevant) cross-effects prevalent in large-
scale AEMs (sectoral breakdown, representation of demand and supply, closure rules just to name a 
few). We nevertheless perform a robustness-check based on sensitivity analysis of key model 
parameters, such as substitution elasticities and parameters related to the rent allocation. 
2.2 Methodology for consistent aggregators of trade policies 
This section is a formal introduction to the welfare consistent tariff aggregators for the general 
equilibrium framework, and to the extensions we propose. It is organized as follows. Section 2.2.1 
describes the state-of-the-art by introducing Anderson's (2009) optimal combination of tariff 
aggregators. Section 2.2.2 introduces an explicit regional dimension in the standard framework in 
order to deal with tariff dispersion over exporter regions. Section 2.2.3 further extends the 
methodology by defining consistent aggregators for tariffs under TRQs. 
2.2.1  Standard welfare-consistent aggregators 
While Bach and Martin (Bach and Martin, 2001) first called attention to the problem of welfare 
consistent tariff aggregation in the general equilibrium framework, our discussion below builds 
mostly on the subsequent work of Anderson (Anderson, 2009), using his notations and terms, and 
refers back to the original Bach-Martin approach only to highlight differences. These tariff 
aggregation techniques aim at deriving uniform tariffs that are optimal in the sense that they yield 
the same welfare result as the detailed tariff structure would do. Structure, parameterization and 
input data of the underlying model all have an impact on the derived aggregated tariffs. 
Let us consider a small open economy, where a subset of tradable goods is to be aggregated. The 
vector of domestic prices is partitioned to ( , ),p   where p  and   denotes the price vector of 
products to be aggregated and other tradables, respectively. Trade policies4 wedge domestic prices 
away from constant world prices ( , ).
w wp   The difference between the consumers’ expenditure 
function and the gross domestic product (GDP) function defines the trade balance equilibrium 
condition for the economy: 
 , ) ( , , ) (, , )(E e pp u u g p     
where u denotes real income. The excess demand functions can be derived by Shephard‘s and 
Hotelling’s Lemmas respectively: 
p p pE e g   and E e g     (the subscripts denote partial 
derivatives). 
The balance of trade condition then guarantees that the value of imports is equal to the value of 
exports plus a possible financial inflow :b  
 , , , ) (( , , ) ( , ) ( ) 0.
w w w w
pB p E p E Eu p u p p b           (2.1) 
By fixing real GDP, the function B  above (termed the balance of trade function) provides a 
compensation variation measure of welfare changes (Martin, 1997). The TRI index (Anderson and 
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 For the sake of simplicity, we only consider tariffs as a cause for the price wedges in this theoretical 
discussion. Accordingly, we refer to the aggregation of trade policy instruments as tariff aggregation.  
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Neary, 2005) is based exactly on this welfare measure and equal to the uniform tariff factor denoted 
by 1    that would aggregate the single tariffs without altering the balance of trade: 
 ) ,: ((1 , , , ) ( , , , ).,
w w w w wB p u p B p u p         
Consistent aggregation with regard to the balance of trade function requires further restrictions 
both on the supply and demand sides of the economy. We assume (weakly) separable demand for 
the product group with price vector p  and assume that the group enters consumer preferences 
homothetically. Separable homotheticity implies two-stage budgeting and allows to define price 
indexes over product groups entering the top level of the consumers’ budget allocation problem 
(Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980).  
That type of consistent aggregation excludes relative price changes on the supply side in the 
commodity group being aggregated. A sufficient condition for that restriction is that supply prices 
(the world price vector 
wp ) are independent of trade policies, satisfied in the small country case. 
Even weaker supply side separability assumptions can make consistent aggregation possible, as 
discussed by (Anderson, 2009). 
While the TRI index reproduces the balance of trade, it cannot get both the trade volumes and the 
tariff revenues right (Anderson, 2009). Bach and Martin (2001) therefore suggest two different 
aggregators in equation (2.1): one for the trade expenditure  expT  and one for the tariff revenue 
part  trevT . Taking advantage of separable homotheticity, we can construct an aggregator for the 
expenditure part as an implicit function of the domestic price vector5: 
,: | ( ( ), , , ) ( , , , ).,n w w w wE p u p E p u p        (2.2) 
The True Average Tariff (Anderson, 2009) can then be introduced as the aggregated price wedge 
relative to the aggregate domestic price: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1
)
.
(
w wp p p
p
T
p
   
 

     (2.3) 
The TAT is conceptually equivalent to the Bach and Martin trade expenditure aggregator. The latter, 
however, measures the aggregate price wedge relative to an average world price. In fact, if the 
wp  
world prices are uniform then the following relationship holds between the two aggregators: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1
1 1.
1( ) ( )
w
exp
w w
p p p
p
T
Tp 
  
 
    


 (2.4) 
Under specific restrictions, it is possible to derive a closed-form solution for expT  (see Manole and 
Martin, 2005). Here we focus on setting up a modeling framework to numerically derive the tariff 
aggregators, and so for our purposes the above implicit formula is satisfactory. 
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 Note that   inherits the homogeneity property of the expenditure function. 
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Following Anderson, we define the second aggregator for the tariff revenue part as a combination of 
T   and the simple trade weighted average tariff. The latter is calculated as: 
 ,
j
a
j jT w T   (2.5) 
where the index j  runs over the imported goods with price vector ,p  / ( )
j jj p pj jj
w p E p E 
denote value shares and ( ) /j j
w
j jT p p p   are the single tariff rates relative to the domestic 
prices. The expression for tariff revenues then can be substituted with an optimal combination of 
( , )aT T  in equation (2.1): 
 
( ) ( )
( , ( ) 0) .
1 1
,
w w
a wpE E E b
T T
p
u T   
 
      
 
  (2.6) 
The above aggregation is consistent with respect to the domestic expenditure on imports (by 
definition, see the first term) and also guarantees that the aggregation does not alter welfare (the 
balance of trade remains unchanged). Obviously, that also implies consistency with respect to tariff 
revenues as the difference between the trade balance and trade expenditures. 
2.2.2  Introducing a regional dimension for the tariff aggregators 
In the following section we introduce an explicit regional dimension in the above framework by 
splitting up the exporter country into sub-regions. As a result, imported goods are differentiated 
both by tariff line and by place of origin. First we define sub-region-specific aggregator functions 
analogue to equation (2.2): 
 
1 1( , ): | (( ( )) , ( ,, , ) , ),
n m n
n i
n
iE p u uE p    
    (2.7) 
where the i  subscript runs over the exporter regions and the number of imported product types 
(number of tariff lines) is .m  Exporter specific versions of the True Average Tariff rates can then 
simply be calculated as: 
 
( )
{1, , }.
(
1 ,
)
w
i
i
i
p
iT n
p
 

      (2.8) 
Unfortunately, there are more variables than equations in the equation system of (2.7) such that no 
unique solution exists, in general. In the separable homothetic case, however, equation (2.7) 
reduces to a problem where the aggregators are calculated based on their impact on the composite 
price index: 
1 1( , ): | ((, ( )) , () ),,
n m n
n c i c
n
i pp p p    

   (2.9) 
simply because in this case , , ,, )( ) (cu pE pp u   where cp denotes the composite price index. 
In particular, it is possible to derive the regional aggregators for each region independently: 
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where 
ip  denotes domestic prices of all imported commodities other than exported by region .i  
The advantage of the formulation in equation (2.10) is that the regional aggregators 
1( )i
n
i  , and 
therefore the regional True Average Tariffs 
iT
 , can be computed in a sequence, rather than solving 
for them simultaneously. Sequential calculation greatly reduces numerical complexity. Appendix A 
provides a formal proof for the equivalence of simultaneous and sequential approaches.  
The second aggregator for the trade weighted averages only needs to be extended with an 
additional regional dimension in order to arrive at exporter specific ones: 
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where j runs over the index set of commodities. The single tariff rates relative to the domestic 
prices are calculated as ,, , ,( ) / ,i j i j i i
w
j jT p p p   and the value shares take the form: 
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Using the inherited homogeneity property of 1 ), (i i n    the optimal combination of 
( , )aT T  can be broken down6 to a sum of regional combinations 
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The above expression leads to the regional version of the balance of trade condition: 
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2.2.3  Consistent aggregators for tariffs under TRQ 
Tariff rate quotas (TRQ) are two-tiered tariff instruments where a lower (preferential) tariff rate is 
applied on imports until a pre-defined quota threshold is reached. Imports exceeding the quota level 
are subject to a higher, typically the Most Favored Nation (MFN), tariff rate. Many TRQs were 
introduced in the Uruguay Round of negotiations during the tariffication process, either to provide 
minimum market access to highly protected markets or to maintain pre-existing trade preferences. 
Although the number of tariff lines protected by TRQs has been decreasing in the last decade, they 
are still crucial border protection measures for agricultural trade (World Trade Organization, 2012). 
Additionally, TRQs are often introduced in the context of FTAs, at least during an intermediate 
implementation period. 
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 For a formal proof consult Appendix B 
28 2.2 Methodology for consistent aggregators of trade policies 
 
 
The world trade of dairy products is traditionally complicated by TRQ regimes, such that inclusion of 
TRQs in the above model structure is relevant for our empirical section. The formal discussion below 
extends Anderson’s treatment (2009, Appendix A) of import quotas to the TRQ case. The 
implementation consists of two main elements: (1) a price mechanism that defines tariff inclusive 
domestic prices depending on the relations between fill rate, excess demand and supply and (2) an 
assumption on how the quota rent is allocated between the home country and exporters, the so-
called quota allocation share. That share primarily depends on the quota administration method 
(Boughner et al., 2000) which is not regulated by the WTO, such that e.g. historical shares, first 
come, first serve or auctions are applied and quite different effective quota allocation shares found 
in practice. 
Let us assume that there exist rent retaining tariff rates for all tariff lines, defining a price level 
(denoted with the price vector ) up until quota rents are retained fully in the home country. Quota 
rents exceeding   are partly attributed to the foreign country, according to the shares vector .s  
The per unit quota rent retained at home then can be calculated as: 
 (1 )( ) (1 ) )( .
w ws p p s s p p          
Quota rents allocated to the importer country appear in the balance of trade as lump sum transfers 
to consumers and only accrue if the quota is filled. Above the threshold normal tariff revenues are 
collected at the out-of-quota rate. After partitioning the excess demand into in-quota and out-of-
quota imports ( , ),
in ut
pp
o
pE E E  the balance of trade condition takes the form: 
in-quota tariff revenue out-of-quota tariff rev.quota rent retianed at home
( , , ) p ) ) (, ) (1 )( ( ) 0,(pref in pref in w out wp p p
wu s s p p E p E pq bEE pp E   
             
 
where 
prefp  denotes import prices at the in-quota tariff rate. Income accrued to the home country 
from the TRQ regime is the sum of tariff revenues and a share of quota rents in our modeling setup. 
These two sources of income are depicted on Figure 2.1 for the small country case, assuming the 
TRQ is overfilled. Imports  pE  are defined by the equilibrium of excess supply and import demand. 
Areas ,D  ( )A B  and  A B C D      correspond to in-quota tariff revenues, quota rent 
retained at home and out-of-quota tariff revenues respectively.  
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Figure 2.1: Partitioning tariff revenues and quota rents in the small country case 
 
Source: own illustration 
Our aim of substituting the TRQ mechanisms at the tariff line with an aggregate equivalent tariff rate 
does not allow for the above partitioning of 
pE  in the aggregate balance of trade condition. 
Therefore, we opt for an alternative formulation and first calculate both the quota rent and the in-
quota tariff revenue for the entire import volume (areas A A B B     and D D , respectively). 
Then we add on top of it a correction for the out-of-quota tariff revenues, corresponding to the area 
.C  That correction is calculated based on the difference between the out-of-quota rate and the unit 
quota rent retained at home: 
 ( ) (1 .)( ) ( )pref pref prefp p s p p s p p s            
Plugging it in the balance of trade condition yields: 
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    (2.11) 
where q denotes the vector of quota thresholds. outI  and qI are vectors at tariff line level indicating 
whether quotas are overfilled such that a correction on out-of-quota imports is needed, respectively 
quotas filled such that quota rents occur. 
The domestic price p  above is derived from a model-endogenous price mechanism. Following a 
popular approach, the TRQ regimes in our modeling framework are represented by orthogonality 
constraints in an MCP framework (Junker and Heckelei, 2012, see appendix there for details).  
In order to reach an aggregate form of equation (2.11), additional terms need to be introduced. The 
aggregator for the rent retaining tariff rates is defined as: 
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The trade weighted average tariff for the remaining quota rent takes the form: 
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Similarly, we introduce two tariff aggregators for the out-of-quota correction term: 
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The in-quota tariff revenues are covered by the aggregator: 
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Substituting the above terms in equation (2.11), the tariff revenue part can be substituted with a 
combination of six tariff aggregators7: 
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The aggregator qT  in equation (2.12) is a correction term calculated over the quota threshold: 
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The tariff aggregators covering tariff revenues and quota rent can be directly matched with the areas 
depicted on Figure 2.1, namely:    ˆ , , ,a R qA A B B T T T     , ,ˆ ˆ,a corr R corrC T T  and 
   ,ˆ .a prefD D T   
                                                          
7
 A formal proof can be found in Annex C. 
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The extension to heterogeneous exporter regions is straightforward and results in the following 
(regionally extended) version of the equilibrium condition: 
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(2.13) 
where the i  subscript runs over the exporter sub-regions. The 
, , ,prefˆ ˆ ˆ( , , , , )R R corr a a corr ai i i i iT T T T T  
regional tariff aggregators are derived by including an explicit regional dimension, following the 
same approach as in section 2.2.2.  
The definition of regional tariff aggregators requires information on the fill rate with respect to 
imports from different exporter sub-regions. This, on the other hand, implies that the quota 
threshold of the TRQ must be allocated between the sub-regions a-priori. The a-priori quota 
allocation limits the competition between the sub-regions for preferential imports. 
The rent allocation parameters and the shadow rates are crucial for the TRQ mechanism, but 
unfortunately, they are largely unknown in applied work. In the special case of no rent retaining 
tariffs ( 0)  and zero allocation shares ( 0),s   for example, , ,ˆ ˆ, Ra co r rr corT T  and 
qT  all become 
zero and the extended equilibrium condition only differs from (1.1) by the endogenous price 
determination under TRQ. This assumption is identical to a perfect quota auction mechanism that 
would allocate the rents fully to the importer country. Assuming 0   and 1,s   on the other 
extreme, would result in allocating the full rent to the exporters and so would eliminate quota rents 
from the equilibrium condition.  
With appropriate combination of ( , )s   a large set of quota administration methods can be 
described. The estimation of such parameters is, however, out of the scope of this paper. Instead, in 
order to assess the robustness of our approach, a sensitivity analysis is performed in section 2.3.1.  
2.3 Empirical examples 
After the quite formal introduction of the previous sections, we provide a more applied perspective 
to the proposed tariff aggregation approach in a numerical example in section 2.3.1. Section 2.3.2 
then evaluates our method through an assessment of the Korean dairy market in the EU-South 
Korea FTA. These empirical examples provide further insights into the proposed methodology8. 
2.3.1  An applied perspective 
Let us consider a small open economy where final demand is depicted by two levels of separability: 
between product groups and between domestic and imported goods within a particular group. The 
first level of separability enables us to concentrate on consumer decisions regarding one product 
group only in the further discussion. The second level of separability, on the other hand, enables 
                                                          
8
 The GAMS code and data of the numerical examples are available as supplementary material to this 
manuscript. 
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defining sub-utility functions for imports and calculating total (group) utility as the function of the 
sub-utility functions and the domestic goods.  
As typical in applied equilibrium models, a nested CES functional form is chosen for our demand 
system (implying homotheticity), with uniform substitution elasticities at both levels (Figure 2.2). 
The consumption of domestically produced goods is represented by one single composite good .D  
Consumer expenditures are allocated to domestic and imported composites at the first stage (based 
on appropriate composite price indexes), while imports are allocated to the single import flows 
1, , )( nx x  at the second stage, independent of total expenditures on imports.  
Figure 2.2: Nested Armington demand structure for imported goods 
 
 Source: own illustration 
The aim of the aggregation exercise is to completely remove the lower nest (that defines the 
imported composite) from the simulation model and thus to collapse the consumers’ budget 
allocation problem to the first stage only. In a first step, a world price and an ad-valorem tariff rate 
for the imported composite are defined that is equivalent in terms of expenditures on imports. Due 
to the homogeneity of the expenditure function, the ad-valorem equivalent for the imported 
composite is identical to a uniform tariff rate applied on all trade flows at the lower nest. That 
uniform tariff rate is conceptually the previously introduced expT  that can be derived either by 
solving the equilibrium model for a uniform tariff rate at the lower nest, or by closed form solutions 
(provided e.g. by Bach and Martin 2001).9 
Applying this uniform tariff rate in the tariff revenue function too would, however, lead to a bias in 
the simplified balance of trade: the difference between expenditures and tariff revenues would open 
up (or close). That bias comes from the different marginal impacts of a change in tariffs on 
expenditures and tariff revenues (Bach and Martin, 2001, page 628). In order to correct for the bias, 
the second step of the aggregation exercise defines a different uniform tariff rate for the tariff 
                                                          
9
 It would be also possible during aggregation to account for the fact that the production costs of the domestic 
good comprise imported intermediates of which tariffs might change, too. That would require adding the 
impact on BOT and considering the resulting price changes for the domestic good. That possibility is however 
not taken into account in the following discussion. It requires firstly further assumptions on substitution 
between intermediate inputs and other (intermediate) factors in production, including their impact on factor 
prices. Secondly, assumptions with regard to the substitution between the imported composite and the 
domestic good need to be introduced as well. This approach would require solving all considered nests 
simultaneously. 
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revenue function. The uniform tariff rate can be derived by fixing tariff revenues at the upper nest 
and numerically solving the equilibrium model for a uniform tariff rate at the lower nest. 
Unlike in the first step, the uniform tariff for the tariff revenues is not the correct ad-valorem 
equivalent that could be directly applied at the upper nest. Substituting single tariff rates with a 
uniform one implies a change in the import mix and so an adjustment both in the average world 
price and the total imported quantities. At the same time, switching off the lower nest would imply 
that tariff revenues are calculated based solely on the average world price and the imported 
composite 2U . Thus the uniform tariff rate needs to be corrected to these two effects before 
plugging it as ad-valorem equivalent in the upper nest: both the adjustment in the average world 
price and the difference between total imports in quantity terms and in utility terms need to be 
taken into account. 
When setting up a similar framework, Bach and Martin (2001) made the domestically produced good 
the price numeraire and assumed it as non-tradable in order to eliminate the GDP function from the 
balance of trade condition of equation (2.1). That leads them to define their ‘simplified balance of 
trade function’, at the expense of counter-intuitive results in trade liberalization scenarios: imports 
at fixed world prices (a quantity index of imports) decreased. Reducing tariffs increased the share of 
those imported goods facing relatively higher tariffs and therefore having a higher marginal utility 
per unit in the benchmark, because the CES utility aggregator requires smaller import volumes of 
these goods to reach the same level of utility. Here we relax somewhat these strong restrictions on 
the supply side. Following Anderson (2009) we assume that the domestic price of the domestically 
produced good D  is defined fully by the (fix) world prices, and allow for a substitution between 
domestic and imported goods at the same time by making the domestic good exportable. That 
assumption still leads to the simplified balance of trade function, but delivers more intuitive results 
in trade liberalization scenarios (increasing imports due to the substitution effect). Still, as indicated 
above, we refrain from taking impacts of tariff liberalization on production costs into account. 
In order to tackle heterogeneous exporter regions in our framework, the Rest of the World is split up 
into two single countries ( 2)n  , both of them facing the same tariff schedule but having different 
compositions of trade. The balance of trade condition of (2.13) in this case takes the form: 
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   (2.14) 
where 𝑝𝑐  is the composite price index, defined as: 
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?̅? denotes total imports in the benchmark, 𝜎 is the substitution elasticity, b is the balance of trade 
in the benchmark, and the exporter sub-regions are indexed with j. The CES utility aggregators 
satisfy the separability and homogeneity conditions, and so 
iT
  can be calculated with the 
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sequential numerical approach of equation (2.10). The import demand quantities 
i
E  are calculated 
in this pre-step as well. In the numerical example below we further assume uniform world prices 
equal to unity  wp  1  , which allows for a further simplification: ( ) 1, 1,2.wi p i     This 
selection of the world prices also implies that the functional relationship of equation (2.4) between 
expT  and T   holds in our results. The tariff aggregators , , , 1)
ˆ ˆ ˆ( , , , , ,a a pref a corr R R corri i i
n
qi iiT T T T T T   can be 
derived directly from the formulas in section 2.2.3. 
The benchmark data on imports and expenditures are identical to those in Bach and Martin (2001) 
to allow for direct comparison (Table 2.1). Trade policies are defined over six tariff lines with a 
dispersed tariff structure. Expenditure on domestic goods equals to 2000 while the substitution 
elasticity is set to 2. In order to illustrate the extended tariff aggregation technique, some tariff lines 
are protected by TRQs with zero preferential rates and high MFN rates such that TRQs are filled. 
Consequently, shadow rates, and so quota rents, are positive in the benchmark. Our illustrative 
trade liberalization scenario assumes no tariff reduction, as was in the case in Bach and Martin 
(2001), but an expansion of the quota thresholds.  
Table 2.1: Benchmark and scenario assumptions 
 
Benchmark 
 
Liberalization scenario 
Tariff lines Applied rates 
Quota 
threshold 
Expenditure on imports 
at world prices  
Applied 
rates 
Quota 
threshold 
  
both regions both regions R1 R2 
 
both 
regions 
both 
regions 
t1 10 - 100 - 
 
10 - 
t2 10 - - 100 
 
10 - 
t3 10 - - 100 
 
10 - 
t4 200* 100 100 - 
 
** 120 
t5 200* 100 - 100 
 
** 120 
t6 200* 100 100 - 
 
** 120 
        * shadow rate,i.e. the tariff rate of the marginal imports under TRQ 
** tariff rates of the marginal imports under TRQs depend on the changes in import demand and are 
therefore not know a-priori 
Source: own elaboration 
In the benchmark point the Bach-Martin aggregator pair and the TRI, reported under the whole 
exporter region, are identical to the numerical example of Bach and Martin (2001), see Table 2.2. 
This equivalence requires two crucial assumptions regarding the TRQs: (1) the shadow rate under 
TRQ is identical to the applied rates in the Bach-Martin example and (2) quota rents are fully 
attributed to the importer region. That also implies that the aggregators ,
1
,ˆ( , , ),a corr R R corr ii i i
n
qT T T T   
are all zero, greatly reducing the complexity of equation (2.14). Results in the liberalization scenario 
are necessarily different from those in Bach and Martin (2001): our quota expansion scenario implies 
much higher tariff aggregators (and so higher rate of protection) as the substantial tariff cuts did in 
Bach and Martin (2001). 
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The True Average Tariff and the Bach-Martin aggregator for the expenditure function are 
conceptually identical. The main difference is that the former measures the average tariff content 
relative to an average domestic price, while the latter measures the same tariff content relative to 
an average world price. Average world prices being lower than the (tariff inclusive) domestic prices, 
the TAT must be smaller than the Bach-Martin aggregator for the expenditure function. 
Table 2.2: Different aggregated tariffs in percentages terms 
  Benchmark Liberalization scenario 
  Own calculation 
 
Bach-
Martin* Own calculation 
 
Bach-
Martin* 
  R1 R2 
full 
region 
 
full 
region R1 R2 
full 
region 
 
full region 
Bach-Martin, 
expenditure func. 171% 120% 149% 
 
149% 142% 103% 126% 
 
27% 
Bach-Martin, tariff rev. 
func.   
 
96% 
 
96% 
  
92% 
 
27% 
True Average Tariff 63% 54% 60% 
 
  59% 51% 56% 
 
  
TRI   
 
178% 
 
178% 
  
149% 
 
29% 
MacMap-type 
aggregator 104% 57% 81% 
 
  4% 7% 6% 
 
  
           * simulation result from the didactic example in Bach and Martin (2001, p. 631) 
 Source: own calculation 
To calculate trade weighted average tariffs, the TRQ regime needs to be converted into an 
equivalent tariff rate (AVE). A popular approach, underlying the MacMap database, derives the AVE 
according to the market regime (Bouet et al., 2008). When the quota is clearly underfilled (<90%) 
then the associated AVE is set to the preferential rate. If the quota is considered binding (fill rate 
between 90% and 99%10), the AVE is set at the average of preferential and MFN rates. Fill rates >99% 
indicate an overfilled quota where the AVE is set equal to the MFN rate. The approach suffers from 
the consequences of setting the quota rent arbitrarily and from fixed trade weights that ignore 
regime shifts. As imports under TRQ are fixed, an expansion of a binding quota typically delivers a 
huge drop in the MacMap type aggregator: the AVE drops from the MFN rate to the average of the 
MFN and the preferential rate. The same is likely to happen if TRQs are moderately overfilled. This is 
an extreme case of what has already been reported in the literature, that fix weighted aggregators 
underestimate the level of trade restriction and inconsistently measure the gains from trade 
liberalization (Kee et al., 2008). 
Welfare consistent aggregators, on the other hand, depend on the parameterization and benchmark 
data of the underlying optimization model. Increasing the substitution elasticity, for example, would 
allow for larger changes in the consumption bundle, implying larger impacts on consumer 
expenditure and consequently higher values for TAT and TRI. A sensitivity analysis demonstrates that 
dependency of the tariff indexes on the model parameterization (Figure 2.3). The indexes are 
calculated for a random sample drawn for the substitution elasticity; assuming uniform distribution 
over the interval (2, 15) and using a sample size of 1000. All three welfare consistent tariff indexes 
increase, as expected, with the substitution elasticity, illustrating that the gap between welfare 
                                                          
10
 The choice of the middle range (90-99%) depends on the errors in the underlying statistical trade databases. 
Even totally filled quotas can be reported as slightly under filled due to statistical errors. 
36 2.3 Empirical examples 
 
 
consistent and fix weighted (conventional) aggregators is clearly affected by model-
parameterization. 
Figure 2.3: Dependence of the welfare consistent tariff aggregators on the substitution elasticity 
(liberalization scenario) 
 
Source: own illustration 
Our simulation results at the tariff line level (under the constant utility assumption) indicate a 
welfare gain in the liberalization scenario, measured as a decrease in the balance of trade (Table 
2.3). The import shares change in favor of exporter region R1 as imports under expanded TRQs, 
mainly sourced from this region, becomes dominant. A slight substitution of domestic goods with 
imports takes place, generating exports of the domestic good at the same time. The positive welfare 
impact can also be seen from expenditures savings at domestic prices (-119). 
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Table 2.3: Welfare results at the tariff line level (‘true’ values in value terms) 
  
Benchmark 
 
Liberalization scenario 
  
 
R1 R2 full region 
 
R1 R2 full region 
Expenditure on imports at domestic p. 
 
710 520 1230 
 
735 521 1256 
Tariff revenues (incl. quota rent) at domestic p. 
 
410 220 630 
 
402 215 617 
Expenditure on imports at world p. 
 
300 300 600 
 
333 306 638 
Total expenditure at domestic p. 
   
3230 
   
3111 
Balance of trade at domestic p. 
   
600 
   
494 
Source: own calculation 
The retrieved ‘true’ values by running our model at the tariff line level are in Table 2.4 compared to 
the different tariff aggregators. The optimal combination of the aggregators 
,, ,ˆ ˆ ˆ( , , , , , ), a prea a corr R c r q
f R orT T T T T T T  reproduces the change in overall welfare, total expenditure 
and tariff revenues. Furthermore, the regionally extended aggregators reproduce expenditure and 
tariff revenues not only in total, but also with respect to imports from specific exporters. Clearly, the 
conventional MacMap-type aggregators deliver biased welfare results, even if they are calculated at 
a finer geographical resolution11. 
Table 2.4: Welfare results of the test runs with different tariff aggregators (percentage difference to 
‘true’ values) 
Welfare item Regional/total 
MacMap-type 
agg. 
MacMap-type 
agg. (regional 
version) 
Optimal 
combination 
Optimal 
combination 
(regional version) 
Tariff revenues 
R1 
 
-93% 
 
0% 
R2 
 
-86% 
 
0% 
total -90% -91% 0% 0% 
Expenditure on imports (at 
domestic prices) 
R1 
 
2% 
 
0% 
R2 
 
-17% 
 
0% 
total -6% -5% 0% 0% 
Total expenditure total -21% -22% 0% 0% 
Balance of trade total -18% -22% 0% 0% 
       Source: own calculation 
The TRI index is strongly affected by quota allocation parameters because quota rents retained at 
home are modeled as government revenues, and those enter directly the balance of trade function. 
Allowing part of the quota rent being allocated to exporter countries would quite intuitively increase 
the TRI as the TRI summarizes the impact of trade restrictions on the own country’s welfare. If some 
of the quota rent escapes to the rest of the world, the impact of the TRQ regime on the home 
country welfare must be stronger than before. The relationship between TRI and the rent allocation 
shares is further explored in Annex D, including a sensitivity analysis.  
                                                          
11
 The regional version of the MacMap-type aggregator is calculated as trade weighted averages over imports 
from specific exporter sub-regions. 
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2.3.2  Application to dairy markets in the EU-South Korea FTA 
The EU-South Korea FTA analyzed in here is the first of a new generation of so-called comprehensive 
free trade agreements of the EU which address far more aspects of bilateral trade than import 
duties. Still, our focus remains on the negotiated tariff schedule. The impact of the FTA on the 
European dairy exports provides a test case for the techniques developed in the previous sections 
for two reasons. On the one hand, the EU exporter countries enjoy the same preferential access, but 
supply different commodity mixes to the Korean market. The emerging tariff dispersion justifies the 
use of those advanced regional aggregation techniques over exporters that we introduced in section 
2.2.2. On the other hand, the dairy market is traditionally complicated by TRQ instruments, 
methodologically addressed in section 2.2.3.  
The EU has the third highest import share in the Korean dairy market of around 14% in 2012 (USDA, 
2013) following the USA and New Zealand. EU dairy imports face ad-valorem tariffs and bilateral 
TRQs which are progressively cut respectively expanded in the FTA for most of the tariff lines over a 
16 year period. The assessment below derives Member State-specific tariff aggregators taking into 
account the TRQ mechanisms in force on the market. The empirical model shares many of the 
assumptions of the equilibrium framework developed in the didactic example, however now applied 
to a more diverse exporter region with a more dispersed tariff structure. Furthermore, substitution 
elasticities now differ at the two CES nests: 7.3 is chosen for the lower nest according to the 
econometric estimate in (Hertel et al., 2007), while the upper nests assumes more sticky shares with 
only half of the above12. Dairy products are represented by 21 HS-6 tariff lines of which 12 are 
protected by TRQs. Trade flows in the benchmark are from the COMEXT database, tariff and TRQ 
(changes) follow the legislative text of the FTA, and are simulated for the years 2016 and 2026 
Following the compensation variation approach of the theoretical sections, simulations are 
performed under the fix utility assumption. Adjustments in the balance of trade, i.e. changes in the 
financial inflow necessary to close the balance, are then indicating the monetary compensation 
needed to leave overall welfare in the economy unchanged. The pre-model aggregation technique 
we developed in the previous sections is ignorant of the exact shocks (here trade liberalization) later 
used in scenario analysis. The aggregation is only reliant on the equilibrium states, including the 
assumed supply and demand structures, which also makes the fix utility assumption reasonable in 
our case. That type of aggregation is hence highly suitable for applied work, as it only affects the 
benchmark and need to be repeated for each shock analyzed. 
The composition of Korean dairy imports from single EU countries is heterogeneous, leading to 
differences in the calculated regional tariff aggregators (Table 2.5). Aggregated tariffs for those 
countries exporting more under TRQs are typically lower, as they take advantage of the preferential 
market access. The relative size of the derived tariff aggregators are in line with the findings of 
Manole and Martin (2005): assuming the CES functional form and positive substitution elasticities, 
the tariff revenue aggregator is always lower or equal to the trade expenditure aggregator. The 
comparison also reveals that the MacMap-type aggregator with fixed trade weights underestimates 
border protection in case of significant quota increases.  
                                                          
12
 The sensitivity of the different tariff aggregators to the substation elasticity is explored in section 2.3.1 
above. Here we focus on providing a use case for the proposed aggregation method and do not repeat the 
sensitivity analysis exercise. 
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Table 2.5: Tariff aggregators in percentage terms 
  
True 
Average 
Tariff 
Trade exp. 
agg. 
Tariff 
revenue 
agg. 
MacMap-
type agg. 
 
2010 
Belgium 60% 149% 
 
95% 
Germany 62% 163% 
 
114% 
France 51% 105% 
 
34% 
Netherlands 54% 119% 
 
62% 
Rest of EU 48% 91% 
 
43% 
All countries 57% 134% 93% 126% 
     
 
2016 
Belgium 54% 119% 
 
68% 
Germany 57% 133% 
 
100% 
France 41% 68% 
 
3% 
Netherlands 46% 85% 
 
34% 
Rest of EU 33% 49% 
 
5% 
All countries 54% 118% 59% 118% 
     
 
2026 
Belgium 49% 94% 
 
0% 
Germany 55% 123% 
 
98% 
France 37% 60% 
 
0% 
Netherlands 39% 64% 
 
22% 
Rest of EU 30% 43% 
 
0% 
All countries 52% 108% 40% 115% 
Source: own calculation 
A remarkable outcome of our simulations is that the trade balance is worsening in the course of the 
FTA implementation (Table 2.6). This impact is also reflected in the increasing TRI index over the 
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implementation period. Decreasing welfare in the small country case as an impact of trade 
liberalization seems to contradict basic results of trade economy. An important point to recognize is, 
however, that by simulating under fix utility and without factoring in impacts of tariff revenues in the 
consumer decision problem13, the balance of trade condition becomes non-binding. More precisely, 
it is the variable financial inflow that closes the trade balance in our framework, and not anymore 
the equivalence of excess supply and import demand. The standard welfare calculation is also 
further complicated by the assumption that producer prices are independent of trade policies and so 
changes in producer surplus are ruled out. As a direct consequence, there is nothing left to 
guarantee a welfare improvement in trade liberalization scenarios. In other words, the sub-model 
used for tariff aggregation only accounts for the allocative efficiency gains at the lower Armington 
nest, which alone does not need to compensate for the losses in tariff revenues. Integrating the 
welfare consistent tariffs in a full CGE should clearly heal that deficiency. 
Table 2.6: Welfare-related simulation results for South Korea 
    2010 2016 2026 
Total consumer expenditure, at 
domestic p. Mio.EUR 1003 953 917 
Expenditure on imports, domestic p. Mio.EUR 727 724 718 
Expenditure on imports, world p. Mio.EUR 439 529 581 
Expenditure on domestic good, 
domestic p. Mio.EUR 276 229 199 
Tariff revenues, at domestic p. Mio.EUR 277 165 104 
Quota rents, at domestic p. Mio.EUR 11 30 32 
Financial inflow* Mio.EUR 439 482 504 
TRI % 195% 214% 223% 
* The balance of trade is defined as total consumer expenditures minus government revenues from 
border protection instruments minus the value of the domestically produced good 
Source: own calculation 
Although simplified, the above modeling framework is still relevant for testing the consistency of the 
proposed tariff aggregation. In order to evaluate the impact of choosing different tariff aggregators, 
we perform a simulation exercise by plugging in the tariff aggregators in a model version featuring 
one single EU region only. The simulated results are then systematically compared to those derived 
with the model operating at the tariff line level (Table 2.7). Our regional extension of Anderson’s 
optimal tariff combination clearly outperform the standard one in exactly reproducing welfare 
results at the finer geographical resolution. Calculating conventional (MacMap-type) aggregators at 
the regional scale, however, does not significantly improve the welfare-consistency of aggregate 
model results. 
The test runs with the MacMap-type aggregators resulted in higher welfare gains than the ‘true’ 
impact calculated with the tariff line model. Both the drop in total consumer expenditure to reach 
                                                          
13
 The underlying behavioral assumption is that each individual consumer is too small to change tariff revenues 
significantly with the adjustments in his consumption bundle. Therefore individuals do not take into account 
the change they imply in tariff revenues in their consumption decisions (Gilbert and Tower, 2012). 
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the same utility and the improvement in the balance of trade were pronounced. This impact is 
largely due to the AVE representation of TRQs. Even moderate quota expansions are perceived by 
the MacMap-type aggregator as large reductions in the AVE, if the quota fill rate is close to 100% in 
the calibration point, and the preferential rate is significantly lower than the MFN one. The MacMap-
type aggregator therefore overestimates welfare gains and the trade facilitating impact of quota 
expansions. 
So far, literature always found that conventional, fixed weighted aggregators underestimate welfare 
gains. Laborde et al. (2011) find that conventional tariff aggregators underestimate the gains in real 
income from global trade liberalization by around 76% at the global scale. Anderson (2009), 
simulating a unilateral trade liberalization for India, reports that e.g. efficiency gains are dramatically 
underestimated with fixed weighted aggregators (¼ to 1/50 of the true gains). Our results indicate 
that the opposite direction is also possible under more complex trade policy instruments such as 
TRQs. 
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Table 2.7: Relative bias in reproducing the true welfare items with different tariff aggregators (year 
2016) 
    
2016 
        
MacMap 
type 
(uniform 
across all 
exporters) 
MacMap 
type 
(different 
across 
exporters) 
Anderson's 
optimal 
combination 
Anderson's 
optimal 
combination 
-- regional 
extension 
Expenditure on 
domestic good, 
domestic p. 
   
0.1% -55% 0% 0% 
Expenditure on imports, 
domestic p. imports originated in 
    
  
Belgium 
 
2% -7% 
 
0% 
  
Germany 
 
50% -54% 
 
0% 
  
France 
 
-81% 271% 
 
0% 
  
Netherlands -65% 29% 
 
0% 
  
Rest of EU -91% 60% 
 
0% 
  
Rest of the World 60% -88% 
 
0% 
  
Total 
 
0% -8% 0% 0% 
        Total consumer 
expenditure, at 
domestic p. 
   
0% -19% 0% 0% 
Gov. revenue from 
border protection imports originated in 
    
  
Belgium 
 
60% 8% 
 
0% 
  
Germany 
 
221% -10% 
 
0% 
  
France 
 
25% 43% 
 
0% 
  
Netherlands 35% 135% 
 
0% 
  
Rest of EU -35% -5% 
 
0% 
  
Rest of the World 111% -83% 
 
0% 
  
Total 
 
101% -45% 
 
0% 
        Balance of trade 
   
-41% -20% 0% 0% 
Source: own calculation 
2.4 Summary and conclusions 
Although its strong theoretical foundations have been already developed, welfare consistent tariff 
aggregation has not yet gained ground in the impact assessment of FTAs. In this paper, we show that 
it is numerically feasible to derive welfare consistent tariff aggregators from data at the detailed 
tariff line level. In order to tackle the bilateral aspects of FTAs, we extend the Anderson (2009) 
framework of welfare consistent aggregators with an explicit regional dimension. Specifically, we 
develop a sequential numerical method to derive regional versions of the True Average Tariff under 
the assumption of separable homotheticity. Flexible and welfare consistent tariff aggregation is then 
possible by combining the regional aggregators in the balance-of-trade condition of our modeling 
framework.  
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The Anderson framework is not only flexible in terms of introducing the explicit regional dimension 
to the tariff aggregation problem; it also allows a straightforward inclusion of complex border 
protection measures such as TRQs. We define a combination of seven tariff aggregators in a 
modified balance of trade condition to aggregate tariffs and TRQs in a welfare consistent manner. 
The technique is capable of addressing quota rent allocation directly. The importance of the (largely 
unknown) rent allocation on simulation results is further addressed in Annex D. 
The extended tariff aggregation framework is applied both to a didactic example and to an 
evaluation of the Korean dairy market in the EU-South Korea FTA. Our results support the previous 
findings in the literature that conventional fixed weighted tariff aggregators introduce a serious bias 
in aggregated welfare results. Somewhat surprisingly, this bias leads to an overestimation of the 
welfare gains in the specific settings of our FTA simulations. 
The approach presented above aggregates the border protection instruments pre-model into an ad-
valorem rate that afterwards can be integrated in larger AEMs. The proposed aggregation method 
correctly summarizes the welfare impacts of trade policy reforms at the tariff line under specific 
behavioral assumptions that are usually met in the CET/CES nested structures of contemporary CGE 
models. But the presented welfare consistent aggregators do not provide a general solution to 
remove any bias from tariff aggregation for all modeling purposes. While these aggregators correctly 
summarize welfare impacts of trade liberalization, shocks in e.g. the non-trade policy parts of CGE 
models might not be correctly captured. Specifically, the preceding aggregation scheme does not 
allow for relative price changes on the supply side in the commodity group being aggregated 
(Anderson, 2009). Shocks e.g. in the supply part of the CGE model structure would lead to relative 
price changes and thus to inconsistencies between the initial price wedges represented by the 
proposed tariff aggregators and the resulting equilibrium price differences. 
The tariff aggregation clearly depends on the parameterization and input data of the underlying 
model, and so encapsulates much more information than the tariff structure itself, as demonstrated 
with a sensitivity analysis based on different substitution elasticities. It is also unable to factor in the 
effect of (prohibitive) tariffs which lead to zero-trade flows14. Furthermore, aggregated tariffs are 
derived under the assumption of fixed consumer utility, which is not directly compatible with 
standard applied equilibrium modeling practices and might provoke counterintuitive welfare results 
as only welfare gains from trade on the import side are considered. Last but not least, compared to 
conventional aggregators, the welfare consistent aggregators require additionally data on 
consumption at the aggregate level. 
These findings directly lead to recommendations for empirical work. Against the background that 
welfare consistent aggregators clearly outperform simple trade weighted averages in our own, but 
also any application found in literature so far, at least their use for pre-model aggregation can be 
clearly recommended. The GAMS code available from the authors underlines that its application is 
nowadays no longer a demanding exercise once disaggregated data are available. This can be tariff 
line data or more detailed sectoral and regional Social Accounting Matrices to be aggregated. 
                                                          
14
 The MacMap methodology builds on average trade shares from similar countries to overcome the zero trade 
issue. Such an approach could potentially be used with the welfare consistent aggregators too. 
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The illustrative scenario on the EU-South Korea FTA above is too restricted to derive serious policy 
recommendations from the simulated result. It therefore remains for further research to test the 
extended aggregation technique in application of large-scale AEMs, where the simultaneous cross-
sectoral effects of FTAs can be observed. Here, the implementation of the proposed technique 
should allow for impact analysis and related policy recommendations that are not subject to two 
biases of conventional tariff aggregation methods: (1) aggregation over exporter regions with 
significant tariff dispersion and (2) variable tariff rates determined by TRQ regimes. 
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2.6 Annex 
2.6.1 Appendix A 
In order to show the equivalence of 
1( )i
n
i   and 1( )i
n
i   we first reformulate the definition of the latter 
in equation (2.10), by applying Euler’s theorem on homogeneous functions. For the sake of simplicity 
we drop the price vector   . This simplification does not alter the validity of our results. 
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By substituting the above expression back into equation (2.9), we show that the conditions for the 
1( )i
n
i   aggregators are satisfied too: 
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2.6.2 Appendix B 
Anderson’s optimal combination of tariff aggregators in the balance of trade function can be 
substituted with an equivalent combination of exporter-specific aggregators, in case of separable 
homothetic consumer preferences. 
Recognizing that the 
1( )i
n
i   aggregators, defined in equation (2.7) inherit the homogeneity 
property from the expenditure function: 
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Reformulating the tariff revenues by plugging in the regional aggregators yields: 
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In other terms, the optimal combination of tariff aggregators can be broken down to a sum of 
optimal combinations: 
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Substituting this expression into equation (2.6) yields the regional version of the balance of trade 
condition: 
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2.6.3 Appendix C 
It is possible to define a welfare consistent combination of the tariff aggregators defined in section 
2.2.3 in the aggregated balance of trade condition. Exploiting the homogeneity of   we show that 
the following equations hold: 
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Substituting these expressions in the tariff revenue part of equation (2.11) yields:
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Substituting this back to the balance of trade condition results in equation (2.13). 
2.6.4 Appendix D 
In section 2.3.1 we gave an intuitive explanation why TRI should increase if quota rents are allocated 
away from the home country. In this appendix the functional relationship between quota rent 
allocation and the TRI is further explored and illustrated. Let us adapt the balance of trade condition 
from equation (2.1) for the case when quota rents are explicitly modeled: 
 ( , ) ( , ) ( , ,, ) ( 0,)
w w w
pu p u p pB p E p E R p p u b       
where we simplified by taking out those consumption goods that are not subject to aggregation 
(with price vector  ), and introduced the function ()R  for the quota rents. The TRI index is then 
defined by a uniform tariff rate (1 )t  that covers quota rents: 
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The difference between expenditure and tariff revenues on the left hand side is equal to financial 
inflow ( ).b  This difference is illustrated for the benchmark case on Figure 2.4 with the segment .AB  
The benchmark TRI is marked 
0(1 ).t
  
The shapes of the expenditure and tariff revenue functions crucially define the impact of allocating 
rent to exporters. The tangent of the expenditure function is equal to the optimal demand (by the 
Shephard’s lemma) and so it is a decreasing function of .t  The marginal impact of tariff increase on 
the tariff revenues is larger, illustrated by a more concave functional specification on Figure 2.4: 
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In order to illustrate the impact of allocating away quota rents from the home country, we set quota 
rents retained at home to zero: 0.R   As the rent retained at home has no impact on the optimal 
consumption bundle (discussed in section 2.3.1), the financial inflow must close the balance, and 
therefore it must increase with the initial quota rents. As a result, the difference between 
expenditures and tariff revenues under the uniform tariff rate (1 )t  must meet the increased 
inflow  .CD  As the marginal impact of a tariff increase on tariff revenues is larger than on 
expenditures (see above), this forces the optimal tariff to move to the right on the horizontal axis 
and increase to 
1(1 )t
 . 
Figure 2.4: Impacts of removing quota rent on the TRI 
  
Source: own illustration 
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We further explore the sensitivity of TRI with respect to the rent allocation parameters with a 
numerical simulation exercise (Figure 2.5). The TRI is calculated for a random sample drawn from 
independent uniform distributions for the rent retaining rate and the rent allocation parameter with 
a sample size of 1000. Clearly, trade restrictiveness of TRQs increases when allocating more rent to 
foreign countries (either by decreasing the rent retaining rate   or the or by increasing the rent 
allocation parameter s ). Similarly, low rent retaining rates result in lower quota rents retained in the 
home country and in higher TRI indices, respectively. 
Figure 2.5: TRI under different combinations of the Rent retaining tariff rate and the Rent allocation 
parameter 
 
Source: own elaboration 
  
Chapter 3: Multipurpose tariff aggregation in global trade models: the 
case of tariff dismantling on the Swiss beef market15  
 
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we develop and compare two aggregation techniques that both take advantage of 
international trade data at the tariff line level. Three important sources of aggregation bias are 
addressed. (i) first the substitution effects at the tariff line, i.e. that the composition of imported 
commodity groups and therefore the weights in the aggregation of individual tariff lines might 
change due to trade liberalization; (ii) also the “water” in tariffs, i.e. that imperfect transmission of 
tariff cuts to domestic prices can have significant impacts on tariff liberalization outcomes; (iii) and 
finally they address the endogenous determination of tariffs under Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) and the 
associated shifts in applied tariff rates. The techniques we propose can be implemented as 
extensions to global trade models without significantly altering core model structures, thereby 
making their implementation in contemporary models relatively easy. Unlike consistent tariff 
aggregation, that is designed to be consistent with a selected economic variable (e.g. welfare) but 
can increase aggregation bias for other results, we propose alternatives that decrease aggregation 
bias for a wider range of model variables. With that we aim at providing multipurpose tariff 
aggregation alternatives that can be used for complex policy impact analysis covering a whole range 
of economic impacts. The tariff aggregators are tested for tariff dismantling scenarios on the Swiss 
beef market. The simulations are carried out with a global, large-scale partial equilibrium model of 
the agricultural sector (CAPRI), here extended with the proposed tariff aggregation approaches. We 
demonstrate that the proposed techniques allow for channelling tariff line level impacts to more 
aggregated levels of trade modelling.  
Keywords: tariff aggregation, Tariff Rate Quotas, beef market, Trade liberalization, water in tariffs 
JEL: F13, F15, Q17, Q18 
                                                          
15
 An earlier version of this chapter has been presented as  Himics, M., Listorti, G., Tonini, A. (2017). "Advanced 
tariff aggregation in global trade models: dismantling tariffs on the Swiss beef market." at the 2017 
International Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists (EAAE), Parma, Italy and 
available online on AgeconSearch: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/261284 
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3.1 Introduction 
Market access policies are typically defined at the detailed tariff line level16. The “tariff schedule” of 
a country normally includes thousands of tariff lines, and trade statistics are also recorded at this 
fine level of disaggregation. As trade negotiation (tariff cuts, exceptions to tariff cuts, sensitive 
products etc.) are made at the tariff line level both in bi- and multilateral trade talks, the 
disaggregated tariff data (tariff distributions) should be taken into account when assessing the 
economic impacts of trade policy reforms. Most empirical models of international trade, however, 
cannot fully take advantage of such disaggregated available data when working with aggregated 
commodities, each of them often covering a wider array of tariff lines.  
The straightforward way for better exploiting existing datasets at the tariff line level would be to 
extend trade models to the tariff line. There are indeed some attempts in the literature in this 
direction. Grant et al. (2007) link in an iterative manner a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
model with a satellite partial equilibrium (PE) model for the dairy products. Narayan et al. (2010) opt 
for a nested approach for extending a general equilibrium (GE) model with PE module working at the 
tariff line level for the impact assessment of the tariff liberalization for the Indian auto industry. Britz 
and van der Mensbrugghe (2016) advocates advanced database filtering methods and algorithmic 
improvements to avoid pre-model aggregation. These examples, however, still offer only partial 
solutions, as they either do not cover all sectors or they still do not disaggregate the model to tariff 
lines. Computational and data issues still force practitioners to stick to more aggregated commodity 
and regional groups in applied trade modelling. Statistics on both demand and supply are still lacking 
at the tariff line level and, when extending import demand systems to the tariff line, the number of 
possible bilateral trade flows quickly becomes computationally unmanageable. Practitioners are, 
therefore, confronted with the choice of a tariff aggregation method that fits both their modelling 
tools and the objective of their modelling exercise.  
Unfortunately, tariff aggregation is often subject to several sources of biases in the simulated 
impacts of trade policy reforms. In the context of gravity estimations Anderson and Wincoop (2004) 
identifies those dimensions of the aggregation where aggregation bias occurs; across trading 
partners, across goods and policy instruments. The literature is, however, inconclusive about the 
empirical magnitude and even the direction of the aggregation bias. While e.g. French (2016) finds a 
downward bias in a flexible model allowing for comparative advantage across products for every 
country, Bektasoglu et al. (2016) calculate an upward bias in estimating non-tariff measures with 
traditional gravity modelling techniques, or Anderson (2009) finds an upward bias too in a 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) analysis.  
In this paper we focus on three specific sources of aggregation bias, namely the (i) substitution effect 
at the tariff line, the (ii) "water" in tariffs and the (iii) impact of Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQ). To the best 
of our knowledge, this is the first attempt in the literature to propose tariff aggregators addressing 
the three sources of bias above. The selection of the above sources is primarily motivated by the 
specificities of the empirical application of the proposed tariff aggregation methods: the Swiss beef 
                                                          
16
 The Nomenclature of the Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, or “HS 
Nomenclature”, elaborated under the auspices of the World Customs Organization, comprises about 5,000 
commodity groups identified by a 6-digit code and arranged according to a legal and logical structure. The 
Swiss tariff schedule comprises additional 8-digit subdivisions, which is the level of disaggregation considered 
in this paper. 
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market is characterized by significant "water" in tariffs, it is also regulated by a complex system of 
TRQs, and the substitution effect between different beef products is likely to be significant. 
Nevertheless, the above three sources of aggregation bias are relevant for a wider range of policy 
applications too. The binding overhang (related to the tariff "water" and defined as the gap between 
the bound and the applied MFN rates) still seems to be relevant when assessing trade policies 
(Beshkar et al., 2015), TRQs are still crucial border protection measures for agri-food markets (WTO, 
2012), and the price sensitivity of consumers that can lead to substitution effects in the consumption 
is particularly important in developing and low-income countries (Muhammad et al. 2017). Thus 
there is room to exploit the possibilities of the proposed aggregators in future research in applied 
trade modelling. 
The first source of aggregation bias we are focusing on is linked to the heterogeneity of commodity 
groups. Trade liberalization often leads to significant changes in the composition of the commodity 
group, which is a demand side adjustment to relative price changes. Assuming fix relative shares in 
trade flows within a commodity group, as done in standard tariff aggregation, is often too restrictive. 
If some particular tariff lines within a commodity group are subject to significantly lower or higher 
initial tariffs, or in case tariff lines are liberalized to a different extent, a significant change in the 
relative import shares can be expected. In fact, the issue of fix trade shares within commodity 
groups already hinders the correct implementation of tariff schedules (and their change) in 
aggregate global equilibrium models. Tariff cuts for commodity groups that are calculated with the 
fix shares assumption already introduce trade liberalization scenarios with a large degree of 
approximation.  
The second source of aggregation bias is due to an imperfect transmission of tariff cuts to reductions 
in domestic prices. We refer to the part of the applied tariff rate that needs to be eroded before 
tariff cuts have a direct impact on the domestic price as the “water” in tariffs. This is somewhat 
different from the standard binding overhang definition in literature, which is the difference 
between bound and applied rates (e.g. Bchir et al. 2006). Our definition is more data intensive as it 
requires detailed information on domestic prices. In the presented modelling exercise these data are 
available due to a specific dataset on Swiss domestic prices. Both definitions of "water" refer to the 
buffer that countries have in trade negotiations to lower bound tariffs without impacting current 
applied tariffs. Under a fix world price assumption it also creates a buffer for negotiating offers 
without impacting domestic prices of imported goods. Conventional tariff aggregation techniques 
are based on simple price wedges and they calculate domestic prices simply by adding applied tariffs 
on top of world prices. In this paper we highlight the importance of the “water” in tariffs in tariff 
aggregation, and we provide an appropriate methodology taking advantage of a detailed database 
for Swiss domestic prices for beef products.  
Finally, we cover the endogenous determination of tariffs under TRQ as an important source of 
aggregation bias. In a TRQ system the applied tariff rate changes depending on the quota fill rate 
(and therefore on the level of imports). Standard aggregation techniques do not always take that 
into account, or at least not at the tariff line level, that leads to an over or underestimation of the 
applied tariff rate. As a substantial proportion of agricultural production in developed countries is 
protected by TRQs (see for example de Gorter and Kliauga, 2006), the TRQ issue is especially 
relevant for agri-food markets. As the Swiss beef market is also characterized by a complex TRQ 
system, the issue is highly relevant for our empirical example. We propose two approaches to 
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aggregate tariffs under TRQ by taking into account the model-endogenous adjustment of applied 
tariff rates depending on quota fill rates. 
We propose and develop two different approaches to adjust for the above aggregation biases. The 
trade expenditure aggregator (TE) is an equivalence measure of tariff protection, defined as the 
uniform tariff rate that is equivalent with a set of individual tariffs in terms of its impact on trade 
expenditures (see also Himics and Britz, 2016). Calculating trade expenditures requires setting up an 
import demand system at the tariff line level for the TE aggregator, which in turn enables us to 
calculate with the changes in the composition of commodity groups. The TE aggregator, as we 
propose here, also includes explicit TRQ functions at the tariff line level to take into account the 
adjustments in applied tariff rates under TRQ. 
In the second approach, we increase the complexity of a typical outcome measure
17
 (weighted 
average tariff) through endogenous aggregation weights based on the demand responses of a 
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) import demand system, defined at the tariff line level. The 
Tariff Reduction Impact Model for Agriculture (TRIMAG) aggregator takes into account the changes 
in the optimal consumption mix due to relative price changes after a certain tariff dismantling rule is 
applied (see also Listorti et al., 2013). Assuming (and parameterizing) a specific import demand 
system allows the TRIMAG aggregator taking into account substitution effects at fine (8-digit level) 
level of the tariff lines. As in the case of the TE aggregator, only responses in consumer expenditure 
are considered, and the welfare impacts of tariff revenues are here neglected. This characteristic 
allows also for a more straightforward assessment and comparison of the two aggregation 
approaches. Ignoring the income effect of foregone tariff revenues seems not too restrictive in the 
PE framework used and presented in this paper, or in case tariff revenues has little impact on 
consumer income18.  
TRIMAG takes advantage of its unique database of domestic and c.i.f. import prices of agri-food 
products at the very detailed 8-digit level, and calculates with the "water" in tariffs explicitly. By 
estimating the "water" in tariffs, TRIMAG addresses the imperfect price transmission of tariff cuts to 
domestic prices. TRIMAG also calculates for the aggregated commodity groups in- and out-of-quota 
rates, which can be directly plugged into aggregate trade models. 
Therefore we cover all three sources of aggregation biases identified above: changes in the 
composition of the imported mix, “water” in the tariffs and TRQs. The features of each aggregators 
included in this paper are summarized in Table 3.1.  
We test the proposed two aggregators by analyzing alternative Swiss tariff dismantling scenarios for 
beef imports. We follow a two-stage, comparative static approach that is typical in applied trade 
                                                          
17
 We follow the definition of outcome measures by Cipollina and Salvatici (2008), and define those as 
measures based on policy variables and weights. Although some economic effects might be taken into account 
when calculating outcome measures, they remain a-theoretic since they are not originally constructed 
according to equivalence criteria. 
18
 Most of the literature on tariff aggregation in the general equilibrium simply channels tariff revenues to 
government or to consumers in the form of a lump sum transfer (Bach and Martin 2001, Anderson 2009). In a 
PE framework, such as the one developed later in this paper, that covers only a limited number of 
commodities (e.g. agri-food markets), and without the economic agent of the government that re-distributes 
tariff revenues in the economy, the substitution effect is expected to outweigh the income effect. Therefore 
ignoring the latter effect might be justified.  
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modelling (Francois et al., 2005, Philippidis and Sanjuán, 2007, Egger et al., 2015 to name a few). 
First we estimate aggregated ad valorem equivalent (AVE) tariff rates using disaggregated data. 
Second, we plug in the estimated AVEs in a partial equilibrium (PE) model working with more 
aggregate product definitions. More precisely, both the TE and TRIMAG aggregators are 
implemented as pre-model aggregation modules in the same large-scale global PE modelling 
framework, the Common Agricultural Policy Regionalized Impact (CAPRI) model (e.g. Britz and 
Witzke 2014), which renders systematic direct comparison possible. Assuming different tariff 
dismantling scenarios for the EU beef exports to Switzerland, both pre- and post-reform aggregated 
tariffs are calculated with the TE and TRIMAG approaches. In order to evaluate the performance of 
the proposed aggregators in policy impact assessment, the aggregated tariffs are plugged into CAPRI 
and the economic impacts of the liberalization scenarios are simulated.  
Table 3.1: Properties of tariff aggregators in respect to selected aggregation biases  
  
Traditional (fixed 
weight) aggregators 
Trade Expenditure (TE) 
aggregator 
TRIMAG aggregator 
Substitution effect 
at the tariff line level 
Not taken into 
account 
via CES import demand 
system 
via CES demand system for 
aggregation weights 
Water in tariffs 
Not taken into 
account 
Not taken into account 
Explicitly taken into 
account using a specific 
dataset on domestic and 
c.i.f. prices 
Tariff Rate Quotas 
(TRQs) 
via tariff equivalent; 
fix applied rate 
via tariff equivalent; 
variable applied rate 
with explicit TRQ 
functions 
Via TRQ function at 
aggregate level; calculates 
both aggregated in quota 
and out of quota rates 
Source: Own comparison 
A more precise illustration of the modelling approach is presented on Figure 3.1, also comparing it to 
traditional, fixed weight aggregation. First we calculate the current aggregated tariffs for CAPRI with 
the different tariff aggregation modules. Those enter the calibration process of CAPRI acknowledging 
the different aggregated tariffs the aggregation methods can provide: a single ad valorem equivalent 
tariff in the TE aggregator versus both in-quota and out-of-quota tariff rates in TRIMAG. The 
calculated aggregated ad valorem equivalent tariffs contribute to define the so-called CAPRI 
reference scenario used as a yardstick in our analysis. In simulation, the aggregated tariffs 
corresponding to the tariff schedule of the trade liberalization scenarios are calculated with the two 
aggregation approaches. The aggregated tariffs are then plugged into CAPRI that in turn provides the 
simulated impacts on trade (market balances and prices) and welfare for the different policy 
scenarios.  
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Figure 3.1: Extended modelling approach with pre-model tariff aggregation modules 
Source: own illustration 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 and 3.3 formally introduce the TE and TRIMAG tariff 
aggregation approaches, respectively. Section 3.4 shortly describes the CAPRI model. Section 3.5 
defines the application to the Swiss beef market as well as the test tariff dismantling scenarios. Data 
and simulation results are presented and discussed in Section 3.6. Concluding remarks are reported 
in Section 3.7. 
3.2 The trade expenditure (TE) tariff aggregator 
The TE aggregator, as we define below, is conceptually equivalent to the expenditure aggregator 
originally proposed by Bach and Martin, (2001) and to the true average tariff of Anderson (2009). 
More precisely, we introduce the TE aggregator here following the regionally explicit approach of 
Himics and Britz, (2016), using mostly their notation and sometimes referring back to that paper for 
further references. Previous literature identified the TE aggregator as a component of welfare-
consistent tariff aggregation for the general equilibrium framework. Our contribution here is to 
identify the TE aggregator as a stand-alone aggregation alternative, embedded in a two-step 
modelling approach. Opting for the Himics and Britz (2016) variant of the TE aggregator is exactly 
motivated by the needs of the second (aggregate) modelling step: exporter-specific AVE tariffs for 
the aggregate commodities. We also discuss the specific aggregation biases this approach can 
address, and provide an empirical case to assess the magnitude for the possible correction of biases 
in Section 3.6.  
The TE aggregator aims to derive a uniform tariff that is equivalent to the set of individual tariffs in 
terms of their impact on trade expenditures. In order to quantify the impact we need to construct a 
demand system based on the following trade expenditure function: 
𝐸(𝑝, 𝑣, 𝑢) = 𝑒(𝑝, 𝑢) − 𝑟(𝑝, 𝑣) (3.1) 
where 𝑝 denotes the domestic price vector, including both a domestically produced and imported 
goods. 𝑣 is the vector of input prices, 𝑢 denotes consumer utility, 𝑒(𝑝, 𝑢) and 𝑟(𝑝, 𝑣) are the 
expenditure and GDP (revenue) functions respectively. The trade expenditure function is concave 
and homogenous of degree one in 𝑝 and convex in 𝑣. The domestic price vector is wedged away 
from world prices by an ad valorem tariff vector 𝜏 (“price gap approach”): 
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𝑝 = (1 + 𝜏)𝑝𝑤 (3.2) 
 
The TE aggregator is defined by an implicit function of the domestic price vector: 
𝜙: ℝ𝑛 ⟶ ℝ | 𝐸(𝜙(𝑝), 𝑣, 𝑢) = 𝐸(𝑝, 𝑣, 𝑢) (3.3) 
where 𝑛 is the number of imported goods. We follow a compensation variation approach and keep 
utility fixed at the initial level. Furthermore, the input price vector is assumed not to be affected by 
changes in output prices, allowing us to drop 𝑢 and 𝑣 below for the sake of brevity. The TE 
aggregator represents the aggregate price wedge relative to an average world price: 
𝑡𝑇𝐸 =
𝜙(𝑝) − 𝜙(𝑝𝑤)
𝜙(𝑝𝑤)
 (3.4) 
Following Himics and Britz, (2016) we extend the above implicit function to cover explicitly each 
exporter region 1 … 𝑚: 
𝜑1, … , 𝜑𝑚:   ℝ
𝑛×𝑚 ⟶ ℝ𝑚 | 𝐸[𝜑1(𝑝), … , 𝜑𝑚(𝑝), 𝑢] = 𝐸(𝑝, 𝑢) (3.5) 
 
The regionally explicit version of the TE aggregator then can be defined as: 
𝑡𝑖
𝑇𝐸 =
𝜑𝑖(𝑝) − 𝜑𝑖(𝑝
𝑤)
𝜑𝑖(𝑝𝑤)
,       ∀𝑖 ∈ {1 … 𝑚} (3.6) 
 
The equation system of (3.5) has no unique solution in general, but by exploiting separable 
homotheticity the problem can be rewritten using composite price indexes. As shown by Himics and 
Britz, (2016) the TE aggregators can then be derived independently, in a sequence, and a unique 
solution does exist: 
𝜑1, … , 𝜑𝑚:   ℝ
𝑛×𝑚 ⟶ ℝ𝑚 | 𝑝𝑐[𝜑𝑖(𝑝), 𝑝
−𝑖)] = 𝑝𝑐(𝑝),       ∀𝑖 = 1 … 𝑚 (3.7) 
where 𝑝−𝑖 is the domestic price vector of imported goods other than those originated in exporter 
region 𝑖 and 𝑝𝑐 denotes the composite price index. Using a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
form for the utility function with one domestically produced and 𝑛 imported goods this can be 
expressed as: 
𝑝𝑐 = [𝛽𝑑𝑝𝑑
1−𝜎 + ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝑗𝑝𝑖,𝑗
1−𝜎
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑚
𝑖=1
]1/(1−𝜎) (3.8) 
where 𝛽 denotes calibrated share parameters, 𝜎 is the substitution elasticity and 𝑝𝑑 denotes the 
price of the domestically produced good. 
Note that the CES form in equation (3.8) implies the same substitution elasticity between different 
tariff lines and between products from different exporters. Laborde et al. (2017) apply a nesting 
strategy and implement a second CES nest for the same tariff line from different exporters below the 
nest of tariff lines belonging to the same composite commodity. They conclude that the substitution 
between tariff lines has a significantly larger impact on simulated results as the substitution between 
exporters. In our case, the inclusive PE model (CAPRI) includes a CES nest for imports of the same 
composite commodity from different trading partners. The exporter-specific AVE tariffs 𝜏𝑖
𝑇𝐸  from 
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equation (3.6) enter that lower nest. As a consequence, our setup implies that substitution between 
disaggregated products (tariff lines) from the same exporter is covered entirely by the pre-model 
tariff aggregation module, while substitution between imports from different exporters is addressed 
by the import demand system of CAPRI. 
In case a tariff line is subject to TRQ the 𝑝𝑖,𝑗  prices also depend on the variable tariff rate. To capture 
the possible regime shifts from in-quota to out-of-quota situation (or vice versa) we further extend 
the above aggregation framework with explicit TRQ functions defined at the tariff line level. The 
following system of equations, in the form of complementarity slackness conditions, links the 
applied tariffs to imported quantities in the price transmission equation (3.2): 
𝑞 − 𝐼𝑖𝑛 ≥ 0   ⊥   𝑡𝑠 ≥ 0 (3.9) 
𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡 − 𝑡𝑖𝑛 ≥ 𝑡𝑠    ⊥   𝐼𝑜𝑢𝑡 ≥ 0 (3.10) 
𝑡𝑎 = 𝑡𝑖𝑛 + 𝑡𝑠 (3.11) 
𝐼 = 𝐼𝑖𝑛 + 𝐼𝑜𝑢𝑡 (3.12) 
 
Equation (3.9) drives the regime switch; if in-quota imports 𝐼𝑖𝑛 reach the quota limit 𝑞 then the unit 
quota rent 𝑡𝑠 (shadow tariff) becomes non-zero, representing an out-of-quota market regime. 
Equation (3.10) defines bounds for the shadow tariff that should be equal to the difference of in- 
and out-of-quota rates (𝑡𝑖𝑛 and 𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡 respectively) in case out-of-quota imports 𝐼𝑜𝑢𝑡 occur. Equation 
(3.11) defines the endogenously determined applied tariff rates 𝑡𝑎 based on the in-quota rate and 
the shadow rate, and finally equation (3.12) is the import balance defining total imports 𝐼. The 
equation system (3.9)-(3.12) is defined for all tariff lines that are subject to TRQs. In case TRQs are 
defined on a multilateral basis the quota thresholds are distributed a-priori between the trading 
partners. 
With respect to the link to the CAPRI model, the aggregate (importer-specific) tariff rates of equation 
(3.6) are implemented in CAPRI as AVE tariff rates. As a result, the endogenous modelling of the TRQ 
system in the TE aggregator is shifted from CAPRI to the pre-model aggregation module. The 
advantage of shifting policies to the aggregation module is that TRQs can be also modelled at the 
tariff line level and not only at the aggregate commodity level of CAPRI (e.g. for the product beef).  
It would be possible to calculate not only the TE aggregator, but also a tariff-revenue aggregator and 
opt for a tariff aggregation approach that is fully welfare consistent (Anderson 2009, Laborde et al. 
2017). That approach, however, would require structural adjustments in the original model, such as 
the inclusion of a specific balance of trade constraint. We argue that the use of the TE aggregator 
alone still improves substantially the simulated key impacts on welfare and trade, especially in the 
partial equilibrium setup of our analysis on the Swiss beef tariff dismantling scenarios. At the same 
time, our approach does not require structural adjustments in the inclusive model. 
3.3 The TRIMAG tariff aggregator 
The TRIMAG model, developed by the Swiss Federal Office for Agriculture (FOAG) (Listorti et al., 
2013), aggregates both current tariffs (reference mode) and tariffs modified according to possible 
trade scenarios (simulation mode). In the Swiss tariff schedule, in-quota and out-of-quota tariffs are 
registered under different tariff lines. All Swiss tariff lines are specific (expressed as a fixed charge 
per physical unit of imports) so, in order to perform the aggregation, they are first converted into ad 
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valorem equivalents (shares of the value of the imported good) using the c.i.f. price. This is 
necessary since various 8-digits tariff lines corresponding to the same CAPRI product could have 
different levels of product transformation (e.g., fresh meat and meat preparations), but conversion 
factors from processed to base products are not available. For a given commodity, the aggregation is 
repeated separately for in-quota and out-of-quota tariffs, and for the main importing regions (EU 
and rest of the world RW; see section 3.5).  
In the reference mode, three weighting methods are combined, each having an advantage from a 
particular point of view: (i) an import weighted average accounts for the source of origin of imports 
(EU or RW); (ii) a total imports weighted average focuses on the importance of the specific tariff line 
in the aggregated commodity (iii) a simple arithmetic average is free of the endogeneity bias 
associated with import weights, and that can also take into account tariffs without trade 
observations. The weights for the import weighted average (i) can be expressed as follows: 
𝑤𝑡𝑠,𝑖,𝑟
1 =
𝑉𝑡𝑠,𝑖,𝑟
∑ 𝑉𝑡𝑠,𝑖,𝑟
𝑁
𝑖=1
, ∀𝑡𝑠, 𝑖, 𝑟  (3.13) 
Where V is the import value; ts is the subscript indicating the tariff scheme (in- or out-of-quota tariff 
and single tariff); i indicates the tariff lines, and N is the number of 8-digits tariff lines corresponding 
to the selected aggregate commodity; r (r = 1…R) is the regional subscript for the sources of origin. 
The weights of the total imports weighted average (ii) are as follows: 
𝑤𝑡𝑠,𝑖
2 =
∑ 𝑉𝑡𝑠,𝑖,𝑟
𝑅
𝑟=1
∑ ∑ 𝑉𝑡𝑠,𝑖,𝑟
𝑅
𝑟=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
.  (3.14) 
The weights for the arithmetic average (iii) take the form of: 
𝑤𝑡𝑠,𝑖,𝑟
3 =
𝐼𝑡𝑠,𝑖,𝑟
∑ 𝐼𝑡𝑠,𝑖,𝑟
𝑁
1=1
,  (3.15) 
where I is a binary variable indicating whether a tariff line i is covered by the aggregate commodity 
that is subject to the tariff aggregation. For each tariff line, the final aggregation weight under the 
reference mode 𝑤𝑡𝑠,𝑖,𝑟
𝑅𝐸𝐹  is then simply defined as an arithmetic average of the above three: 
𝑤𝑡𝑠,𝑖,𝑟
𝑅𝐸𝐹 =  (𝑤𝑡𝑠,𝑖,𝑟
1 + 𝑤𝑡𝑠,𝑖
2 + 𝑤𝑡𝑠,𝑖,𝑟
3 ) ∙
1
3
  (3.16) 
The aggregate tariff for the commodity 𝑋𝑋 is then a weighted average using the above weights: 
𝑡𝑡𝑠,𝑋𝑋,𝑟
𝑅𝐸𝐹 = ∑  𝑤𝑡𝑠,𝑖,𝑟
𝑅𝐸𝐹 ∙ 𝑡𝑡𝑠,𝑖,𝑟
𝑁
𝑖=1 ,  (3.17) 
where 𝑡𝑡𝑠,𝑋𝑋,𝑟
𝑅𝐸𝐹  is the aggregated applied ad valorem equivalent rate for the commodity 𝑋𝑋 in the 
reference mode for a given tariff scheme ts and source of origin r. 𝑡𝑡𝑠,𝑖,𝑟 are the respective ad 
valorem tariffs of all tariff lines i assigned to commodity 𝑋𝑋. Combining three weighting methods is 
similar to the approach taken in the standard CAPRI model, although TRIMAG performs the 
calculation at a finer, 8-digit, level. 
In the simulation mode, TRIMAG provides the ultimate impact of tariff dismantling defined at the 8-
digits level on the aggregated applied tariff rates. Aggregation weights change in respect to the 
reference mode. Indeed, the substitution effects in the consumption bundle are endogenously 
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calculated, based on a CES demand system that mimics, under a fix utility assumption, the 
adjustments in the composition of the consumption mix triggered by relative price changes at the 
tariff line level. This is also similar to what the TE aggregator does. The CES demand system is 
calibrated to the weights of the reference mode as derived from above. Intuitively, if the relative 
price of a certain tariff line decreases due to tariff cuts, then its relative consumption, and therefore 
weight, within the aggregate commodity increases. The simulation mode is formally defined by the 
following set of equations, 
𝑈𝑡𝑠,𝑋𝑋,𝑟 = [∑ 𝛿𝑖 ∙ (𝑤𝑡𝑠,𝑖,𝑟
𝑆𝐼𝑀 )
𝜎−1
𝜎𝑛
𝑖=1 ]
𝜎
𝜎−1
 ,  (3.18) 
𝑤𝑡𝑠,𝑖,𝑟
𝑆𝐼𝑀 = 𝑤𝑡𝑠,𝑁𝑈𝑀,𝑟
𝑆𝐼𝑀 [
𝛿𝑡𝑠,𝑖,𝑟
𝛿𝑡𝑠,𝑁𝑈𝑀,𝑟
𝑝𝑡𝑠,𝑁𝑈𝑀,𝑟
𝑝𝑡𝑠,𝑖,𝑟
]
𝜎
,  (3.19) 
∑ 𝛿𝑡𝑠,𝑖,𝑟 = 1
𝑛
𝑖=1   (3.20) 
Where, for a given tariff scheme ts and source of origin r, 𝑤𝑡𝑠,𝑖,𝑟
𝑆𝐼𝑀 is the aggregation weight of tariff 
line i; 𝑈𝑡𝑠,𝑋𝑋,𝑟 denotes consumers’ utility; 𝛿𝑡𝑠,𝑖,𝑟 is the share parameter calibrated to the reference 
weights 𝑤𝑡𝑠,𝑖,𝑟
𝑅𝐸𝐹 ; 𝑝𝑡𝑠,𝑖,𝑟 is the expected domestic wholesale price after tariff cuts; σ >0 is the elasticity 
of substitution; NUM indicates the numéraire tariff line. The aggregate tariff is then calculated as: 
𝑡𝑡𝑠,𝑋𝑋,𝑟
𝑆𝐼𝑀 =
∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑠,𝑖,𝑟∙𝑤𝑡𝑠,𝑖,𝑟
𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑁
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑤𝑡𝑠,𝑖,𝑟
𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑁
𝑖=1
.  (3.21) 
The adjustment in the import mix is therefore driven by the relative domestic price changes at the 
tariff line level in the equation system (3.18)-(3.20). The impact of cutting notified tariffs on 
domestic prices is calculated thanks to a unique database (see section 3.5) and can be explained as 
follows. For each importing region, the import price is calculated as c.i.f. price plus applied tariff. If, 
and only if, after tariff cuts the import price falls below the domestic price level, then the domestic 
price is linearly reduced (in other words, the ratio between the domestic and import price plus 
applied tariff stays constant over time). This rule implies that tariff reductions only have an impact 
on domestic prices if the “water” in the applied tariffs is completely eroded. A unique database that 
includes domestic and c.i.f. prices at the 8-digits level enables TRIMAG to take into account the 
“water” in applied tariffs explicitly. The water in tariff is calculated as the difference between the 
c.i.f. import price plus the applied duty and the Swiss price. Assuming a lower Swiss domestic price 
then the tariff inclusive import price, the water indicates the “overprotective” part of the applied 
duty, i.e. the part that is in excess of what would be needed to maintain the difference between the 
domestic and the c.i.f. price. Under TRQ the water in tariff corresponds to the difference between 
the applied out-of-quota quota duty and the unit quota rent. Being able to estimate the “water” in 
tariffs is a significant advantage of TRIMAG over the TE aggregator where the domestic price is 
assumed to wedge away from world prices by the tariff height only. The expected impact on the 
domestic price are first calculated for both importing regions (EU and RW), and then aggregated 
according to the following possibilities: 1) import weighted average of the two regional import price 
reductions (no substitution is assumed between the import sources), 2) minimum regional import 
price reduction (perfect substitution between import sources, where cheaper imports are assumed 
to fully replace all other imports), or 3) a weighted combination of the previous two options. By 
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considering that the EU is by far the biggest exporter of agricultural products to Switzerland, and 
that tariff reductions will be applied to EU imports only, option 2) is selected for our analysis.  
With respect to the link to the CAPRI model, the aggregated in-quota and out-of-quota ad valorem 
tariff rates for beef are transferred directly to CAPRI. As the TRIMAG tariffs are ad valorem, any 
specific tariff rates (defined on a quantity basis) in CAPRI are converted to their AVE. The 
endogenous modelling of the TRQ system in CAPRI is kept, as in standard CAPRI applications, only 
the in-quota and out-of-quota rates are adjusted by TRIMAG. 
3.4 Short description of the CAPRI modelling system 
The following section provides a short description of the CAPRI modelling system used for the 
scenario analysis of the beef tariff dismantling scenarios. The focus is only on those aspects of CAPRI 
that are relevant for our simulation exercise; a more detailed description can be found e.g. in Britz 
and Witzke (2014).  
The standard CAPRI model is a global comparative-static deterministic partial equilibrium model 
with a focus on European agriculture. Nevertheless, CAPRI includes a global market module covering 
the main agricultural and food commodities. The market module covers 77 countries or country 
aggregates in 40 trade blocks and about 50 products. The model follows the Armington approach for 
simulating bilateral trade flows, taking into account the price impacts of bilateral and multilateral 
trade policy instruments (including ad valorem and specific tariffs and TRQs). The market model 
consists of structurally identical template equations for all regions and commodities. Regional and 
commodity-wise specificities are expressed by the differences in parameterization. Supply and 
demand equations are consistent with microeconomic theory by imposing homogeneity and other 
curvature conditions during calibration. The supply of agricultural and feed compound sector are 
derived from a Normalized Quadratic profit function, while final demand is based on Generalized 
Leontief demand systems (Diewert, 1971). For Switzerland, in order to improve the empirical 
foundation of the supply response, the supply elasticities are based on estimates derived through 
sensitivity analyses carried out using the SWISSland agent based model (Möhring A., et al. 2016). 
The standard CAPRI model has been applied extensively for trade-related policy impact assessment 
in the literature, (e.g. Burrell et al., 2011; Burrell et al., 2014; Pelikan et al., 2015). For the sake of this 
study, however, we extend the standard CAPRI model with pre-model tariff aggregation routines, 
both in calibration and simulation (Figure 3.1). In the case of the TE and fixed weight aggregators, 
model adjustments also included shifting the model-endogenous TRQ mechanism from CAPRI to the 
pre-model aggregation routines. 
3.5 Application and scenario definitions 
The meat sector is of great importance for the Swiss agriculture. In 2015, with about CHF 2 600 
million, the beef production value represented slightly more than a quarter of the total Swiss 
agricultural production (BLW, 2016). The self-sufficiency rate for this product is around 80% 
rendering Switzerland a net importer. The meat sector in Switzerland is currently subject to a 
multilateral TRQ. Out-of-quota tariffs are very high. Given the extremely detailed definition of sub-
quotas within the global TRQ, and also for the presence of a mixed method for their administration, 
the beef import regime is one of the most complex ones amongst Swiss products (Loi et al., 2016).  
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Both proposed tariff aggregation methodologies are implemented at the 8-digits level, therefore 
considering explicitly all registered transactions in the trade statistics and the full detail of the Swiss 
tariff schedule. Aggregating applied tariff rates under TRQs in an equilibrium framework faces the 
challenge that applied tariff rates and imported quantities are interdependent. Furthermore, 
assumptions on the unit quota rents are still unavoidable. Assuming a TRQ fill rate of 100%, which is 
typical for Swiss beef imports, the unit quota rent can be set theoretically to anywhere between the 
in-quota (preferential) and out-of-quota rates. However, the span between the in- and out-of-quota 
rates can be quite large especially when considering the beef commodity group in Switzerland. The 
TE aggregator determines the unit quota rent endogenously, relying on complementarity slackness 
conditions that mimic regime shifts between in- and out-of-quota tariffs at the tariff line level. Quota 
rents in the initial point still need to be assumed in order to perform the calibration of the TRQ 
equations. Instead, TRIMAG takes advantage of its detailed database and defines the unit quota rent 
as the difference between the domestic and the c.i.f. prices at the 8-digits level. The difference 
between the out-of-quota quota duty and this unit quota rent gives information on the amount of 
the overprotective part of the duty, or “water”.  
For the aggregate product “beef” there are 22 in-quota and 23 out-of-quota quota tariff lines (in the 
Swiss tariff schedule, in- and out-of-quota tariff lines do not necessarily have a one-to-one 
correspondence). This product group is very heterogeneous ranging from live animals to fresh or 
frozen carcasses, fresh or frozen meat boneless or with bones in, and offal. The multilateral TRQ No. 
05 for red meat includes beef, horsemeat, sheep and goat meat. The total volume notified at the 
WTO is of 22.500 t. The biggest in-quota imports occur for beef that is further subdivided into 
various sub quotas. Out-of-quota quota tariffs are extremely high, and therefore imports mostly 
occur within the quota limit. For more details see also Loi et al., (2016). 
In order to further ease the evaluation of the methodological improvements, we also calculate 
traditional fixed weight aggregate tariffs. More precisely, we opt for an import weighted aggregator 
that is quite standard in the literature, and that follows the approach of Bouet et al. (2008) for the 
calculation of applied tariff rates under TRQ: (i) if the fill rate is between 95% and 99%, the applied 
rate is an arithmetic average of the in-quota and out-of-quota rates; (ii) below a 95% fill rate the in-
quota rate is taken and (iii) above 99% fill rate with the out-of-quota rate is calculated. As noted e.g. 
by Himics and Britz (2016), fixed weight aggregators set the unit quota rent arbitrarily and therefore 
lead to erroneous aggregate applied rates under TRQ. Nevertheless, it serves as a benchmark for the 
proposed aggregation methods. 
We opt for a simple scenario setup in order to keep the comparison between the two proposed 
methodologies tractable. Note that, as the aggregate initial tariffs are already different using 
different aggregation approaches, one reference scenario (REF) for each approach have been 
developed. In our comparative static analysis trade liberalization impacts are always presented 
relative to their respective reference scenarios. The following two liberalization scenarios are 
implemented: SCEN_1, where a 50% tariff cut applies on all notified tariff lines at the 8-digits level 
(in-quota and out-of-quota) for the beef imports originating from the EU; SCEN_2, similar to SCEN_1, 
but where two out-of-quota tariff lines (0201.3099, fresh boneless beef meat and 0202.3099, frozen 
boneless beef meat) are exempted from the tariff cut. These two out-of-quota tariff lines are 
characterized by comparable specific tariff heights but different aggregation weights in the 
reference scenario, as well as different levels of “water” in the applied duties. The heterogeneity in 
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tariff rates and tariff cuts as well as the presence of significant "water" in tariffs makes these 
scenarios particularly useful for evaluating the proposed tariff aggregators. 
We expect that the three aggregation biases we discuss in this paper will be relevant for our 
scenarios. Firstly, aggregation weights for a product group are not uniformly distributed already in 
the reference scenario (for a distribution of tariff heights, “water” and aggregation weights see 
Figure 3.2). Therefore, the substitution effect at the tariff line level is expected to be significant. 
Secondly, although SCEN_1 assumes a homogenous (50%) tariff cut for all tariff lines, the changes in 
relative import prices is expected to be heterogeneous due to different “water” levels. Comparing TE 
and TRIMAG results in the following section sheds light on the importance of different levels of 
“water” in tariffs. Note here that, while TRIMAG takes into account “water” in both notified and 
applied tariffs explicitly, the TE aggregator follows a “price gap” approach and therefore is not able 
to explicitly consider the impact of the “water” in tariff on domestic price adjustments. Thirdly, 
explicitly considering the TRQ mechanism in the tariff aggregators is also crucial for the analysis on 
the beef sector. As the TRIMAG approach calculates aggregated in- and out-of-quota rates, it allows 
for an explicit TRQ function in the aggregated (CAPRI) model for beef. This is not the case for the 
other two aggregators, where TRQs are fully converted into an ad valorem tariff equivalent. We 
expect lower changes in Swiss beef imports in the TRIMAG case, due to the presence of the explicit 
TRQ function, which model-endogenously increases unit quota rents in parallel with the expansion in 
traded quantities. 
Figure 3.2: TRIMAG calculated ad valorem out-of-quota notified tariffs, “water”, and aggregation 
weights for the reference mode in TRIMAG 
 
Source: TRIMAG. Note: tariff lines are ordered according to tariff height.  
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3.6 Data and simulation results 
This section reviews first the input data and then the simulation results for the proposed tariff 
aggregators. In the TE tariff aggregator, import values and quantities are from the Swiss-Impex 
database (Swiss-Impex, 2015) at 8-digits level; for the analysis we used average import volumes in 
2009-2014. Exporter countries are mapped and potentially aggregated to the CAPRI regional list 
before setting up the equation system of the TE aggregator. Therefore the exporter-specific 
aggregate tariffs of equation (3.7) can be plugged in CAPRI directly. In the Swiss tariff schedule, in-
quota/out-of-quota tariffs are registered under different tariff lines. In order to link that information 
to the TRQ equation system (3.9)-(3.12), out of quota tariffs are paired with their corresponding in-
quota tariff lines. The TRQ equations are therefore defined for the merged (in total 22) TRQ lines for 
Swiss beef imports. 
The same database is used to calculate the fixed weight aggregated tariffs. The crucial difference is 
that in the absence of an explicit demand system at the tariff line level, no substitution effects (no 
changes in aggregation weights) could be taken into account.  
For the TRIMAG aggregator, the base year is defined as an average of the 2004-09 years for all 8-
digits tariff lines of the Swiss tariff schedule. The data on bound and applied tariffs are included in 
the database. Imports values and quantities, as well as c.i.f. prices are differentiated by main origins 
(EU and RW19). Domestic Swiss prices (wholesale level) are also included at this very detailed level, 
enabling a precise calculation of the "water" in tariffs. For the simulation year, exogenous 
assumptions (exchange rate and medium term projections on agricultural markets) are also explicitly 
taken into account and further validated by market experts. 
Aggregated beef tariffs in the corresponding reference scenarios already highlight differences in the 
aggregation approaches (Table 3.2). After TRIMAG calculates an aggregated in-quota rate of 15% 
and an aggregated out-of-quota rate of 145% pre-model, the final AVE of 142% is calculated for the 
aggregated beef commodity during the calibration of the whole CAPRI modelling system. As the AVE 
is close to the out-of-quota rate, a very strong import demand (high unit quota rent) is assumed. The 
83% AVE for the TE aggregator is calculated fully pre-model, at the tariff line level, based solely on 
tariff line level data, including fill rates for the individual tariff lines. That results in a lower 
aggregated unit quota rent for beef in the REF scenario. The fixed weight aggregator calculates an 
initial tariff rate (99%) which is between the two previous approaches. As TRQs on most tariff lines 
are close to 100% filled, the fixed weight aggregator often sets the applied rate at the middle of the 
range between in- and out-of-quota rates. 
Using fixed aggregation weights a 50% uniform tariff cut on all tariff lines (SCEN_1) translates into a 
50% aggregated tariff cut in the aggregated tariff for EU beef imports. Having some tariff lines 
exempt from the cuts (SCEN_2) reduces the aggregate tariff cut to -46%. With both of our proposed 
aggregators we derive an aggregate tariff cut for EU beef products close to 50% in SCEN_1: -48% and 
-51% for respectively.  
Only making two important tariff lines exempt from tariff cuts (SCEN_2) generates significant 
differences among the aggregation approaches in terms of the aggregated tariffs for EU beef 
                                                          
19
 The aggregation of all non-EU partners into RW is due to the fact that more than 70% of the Swiss 
agricultural trade takes place with the EU (see www.agrarbericht.ch). 
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products. Consumers tend to substitute towards commodities with higher relative price drops, which 
in this case induce an adjustment in the consumption mix toward commodities with higher tariff 
content. Also the explicit TRQ functions adjust applied rates upward as imports expand; an effect 
totally missing from the traditional (fixed weight) approaches.  
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Table 3.2: Applied ad valorem equivalent tariffs and impacts on Swiss beef imports 
  Fixed weight Aggregator 
  Aggregated Applied Ad valorem (%) Import Volume (1000 t) 
From REF SCEN_1 SCEN_2 REF SCEN_1 SCEN_2 
EU 15 98.8 
49.4 53.9 
15.7 
26.7 25.5 
(-50%) (-46%) (70%) (63%) 
Brazil 109.0 
109.0 109.0 
2.0 
0.6 0.7 
(0%) (0%) (-69%) (-65%) 
Argentina 85.4 
85.4 85.4 
0.9 
0.3 0.3 
(0%) (0%) (-69%) (-65%) 
USA 40.9 
40.9 40.9 
0.6 
0.2 0.2 
(0%) (0%) (-69%) (-65%) 
  TE Aggregator 
  Aggregated Applied Ad valorem (%) Import Volume (1000 t) 
From REF SCEN_1 SCEN_2 REF SCEN_1 SCEN_2 
EU 15 83.2 
43.2 68.3 
15.7 
26.0 19.1 
(-48%) (-18%) (65%) (22%) 
Brazil 157.8 
157.8 157.8 
2.0 
0.7 1.4 
(0%) (0%) (-62%) (-27%) 
Argentina 140.4 
140.4 140.4 
0.9 
0.3 0.6 
(0%) (0%) (-62%) (-27%) 
USA 67.2 
67.2 67.2 
0.6 
0.2 0.4 
(0%) (0%) (-62%) (-27%) 
  TRIMAG Aggregator  
  Aggregated Applied Ad valorem (%) Import Volume (1000 t) 
From REF SCEN_1 SCEN_2 REF SCEN_1 SCEN_2 
EU 15 142.1 
70.0 86.0 
16.3 
26.8 23.7 
(-51%) (-39%) (64%) (45%) 
Brazil 142.1 
85.4 98.5 
2.1 
2.0 2.0 
(-40%) (-31%) (-2%) (-2%) 
Argentina 142.1 
85.4 98.5 
0.9 
0.9 0.9 
(-40%) (-31%) (-2%) (-2%) 
USA 142.1 
85.4 98.5 
0.6 
0.6 0.6 
(-40%) (-31%) (-2%) (-2%) 
Source: CAPRI simulation results.  
The aggregate cuts in SCEN_2 are reduced substantially using our proposed approaches, unlike the 
relatively small decrease (from -50% to -46%) observed using the fixed weight aggregator. In the TE 
aggregator, the average tariff cut is only -18% for the EU-15 due to an important substitution effect 
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towards the exempted tariff lines. The substitution effect is less pronounced using TRIMAG (the 
average cut in SCEN_2 is -39%) due to taking into account possible water in tariffs. Significant water 
in tariffs can reduce the impact on domestic prices and consequently on the substitution effect 
between tariff lines. The applied tariff rates reported for TRIMAG in Table 3.2 are marginal tariff 
rates. In both scenarios they coincide with the out-of-quota tariff rate, as the increasing imports 
push the TRQ regime to the out-of-quota situation. Another TRIMAG-specific result is the decline in 
the shadow price for non-EU bilateral TRQs, although it has little effect on the imported volumes 
given the relatively very low initial level of imports from non-EU countries. We also note that one of 
the exempted tariff lines (0201.3099) has a very high aggregation weight and therefore reduces the 
average tariff cut substantially, while the other tariff line (0202.3099) has a much lower weight and 
therefore almost no impact on the aggregated cuts (Figure 3.3).  
Figure 3.3: TRIMAG calculated aggregation weights for the reference mode and the two scenarios 
 
Source: TRIMAG. Note: aggregation weights are ordered according to their height in the reference mode.  
Such a difference between tariff cuts in SCEN_1 vs. SCEN_2 is not present for the fixed weight 
aggregator. As individual applied rates are often set according to the simple rule of half the 
difference between in- and out-of-quota rates, making only two tariff lines exempt of the cuts has 
only limited impact on the aggregate tariff rate. An important shortcoming of traditional aggregation 
techniques can be observed: the heterogeneity we introduced in tariff cuts in SCEN_2 is only 
partially impacting the aggregated tariff rates. 
As the aggregate tariff cuts in SCEN_2 are significantly smaller, in relative terms, for the proposed 
aggregation approaches we also expect significant differences in simulated trade impacts. Indeed, 
the EU (as main player on the Swiss beef market) increases exports by 65% in SCEN_1 and by 22% in 
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SCEN_2 when using the TE aggregator; whereas using TRIMAG imports from the EU increase by 64% 
in SCEN_1 and by 45% in SCEN_2 (Table 3.2). The fixed weight aggregator delivers only small 
differences in simulated trade impacts between the two scenarios. 
The equivalent variation measure of consumer welfare increases in all scenarios and under all 
aggregation methodologies (Figure 3.4). This is a standard result for tariff reduction in Armington 
models, and is due to decreasing consumer prices for beef. Conversely, a decrease in the producer 
surplus can be observed, as lower import prices are transmitted to domestic beef producers. There 
are, however, key differences in the magnitude of net welfare increases. With the TRIMAG approach 
we simulated significantly higher welfare gains from the tariff liberalization. The substitution effect 
and the more precise price transmission of tariff cuts to domestic prices due to modelling "water" in 
tariffs and TRQ mechanisms explicitly all increase simulated welfare gains. Simulated net welfare 
gains are the lowest with the TE approach due to the lowest aggregate tariff cuts, especially in 
SCEN_2.  
Tariff revenue impacts are different when using an ad valorem equivalent approach (fixed weight 
and TE aggregators) versus an explicit TRQ function approach (TRIMAG). Using a simple ad valorem 
equivalent tariff the scenario impacts are negative, because the increase in beef imports cannot 
compensate for the decrease in tariff rates. But with an explicit TRQ function in place, such in the 
case of implementing TRIMAG aggregate tariffs in CAPRI, the increase in imports pushes the TRQ fill 
rate well over 100%, and therefore for a large portion of beef imports the higher out-of-quota duty 
applies. That generates an increase in tariff revenues in both scenarios, even though the out-of-
quota rates are lower than those of the reference scenario.  
Figure 3.4: Welfare impacts for the beef sector in Switzerland (changes compared to REF scenario). 
 
Source: CAPRI simulation results.  
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The impact on TRQ rents is negative using the TRIMAG aggregator, as the increasing beef imports 
cannot compensate for the decreasing unit quota rents under TRQ. As the Swiss beef TRQs are fully 
converted into an ad valorem tariff rate with the other two aggregation approaches, no quota rents 
are reported.  
3.7 Conclusions 
In this paper we develop and compare two multipurpose tariff aggregation techniques, the TE and 
TRIMAG aggregators that address important sources of biases in applied trade modelling: 
substitution effects at the tariff line, “water” in tariffs and TRQs. Both aggregators are applied and 
compared relying on a common set of beef tariff dismantling scenarios in Switzerland. The 
comparison is also enriched by adding a fixed weight aggregator in order to compare the 
performance of the proposed multipurpose aggregators against a standard tariff aggregator. The 
beef sector is particularly suited to assess these tariff aggregators since: a) the number of beef tariff 
lines is sufficiently large to render substitution effects among the different lines meaningful; b) the 
beef tariff lines are characterized by different levels of “water” in the applied duty; c) beef is in 
Switzerland regulated by a complex system of import TRQs.  
Both the TE and TRIMAG aggregators are implemented as pre-model aggregation modules in a large-
scale PE model (CAPRI). Our analysis is limited to the agricultural sector with no feedback effects 
from other sectors of the economy. Linking the proposed aggregation techniques to CAPRI does not 
require significant changes in the original model. As the tariff aggregation calculations are made pre-
model, only a single ad valorem equivalent measure20 of various border protection instruments 
(tariffs, TRQs, etc.) enters the original PE model. Thus the trade policy representation in the original 
equilibrium model can be simplified by shifting various border protection instruments into a pre-
model tariff aggregation module. This has obvious numerical advantages compared to a fully 
consistent solution that would extend the original model with PE modules working at the tariff line 
level (e.g. Grant et al., 2007, Narayanan et al., 2010). Given that the tariff aggregation approaches 
we propose only simulate demand side adjustments, they are relatively easy to set up and solve 
numerically, and detailed trade statistics and policy data are available to parameterize the pre-
model aggregation.  
Our results confirm that traditional (fixed weight) aggregators, without appropriately taking into 
account substitution effects, "water" in the tariff lines and an endogenous TRQ modelling, tend to 
lead to biased estimates for the gains from trade liberalization, both in terms of the impact on trade 
flows and welfare (Anderson 2009, Laborde et al. 2017). We also find that the difference between 
the fixed weight aggregator and those proposed to correct for important aggregation biases is 
particularly large when trade liberalization scenarios introduce large variation in tariff cuts. We 
therefore provide further empirical evidence that the use of fixed weight aggregators is not 
recommended in case of large heterogeneity in tariffs structures. This is not only true when the 
variability of the initial tariffs is high (Laborde et al. 2017), but also in case trade liberalization is 
expected to increase tariff dispersion to a large extent. Thus the proposed tariff aggregation 
                                                          
20
 In an attempt to use fully welfare consistent aggregation in the general equilibrium framework, Anderson 
(2009) has to modify the original balance of trade condition by introducing a combination of two tariff 
aggregators. Himics and Britz (2016) need to increase complexity in the trade balance constraint in order to 
take into account TRQ rents and the geographical composition of exporters, combining in total six different 
tariff aggregators. 
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methodologies can significantly improve the quality of ex-ante policy impact assessments, without a 
heavy burden of modifying core model structures. The fact that both the TE and the TRIMAG 
aggregators can be implemented as pre-model aggregation modules without significantly altering 
existing model structures represents a clear potential for their more wide-spread use in applied 
trade modelling. 
Some caveats to the proposed approaches, however, must be highlighted. A serious shortcoming of 
the approaches is that the impact of changing trade policies on domestic supply is neglected. In fact 
the TRIMAG and TE aggregators only account for the consumption gains from trade but not for any 
production or specialization gains. Whether this is an acceptable restriction remains case specific. In 
our empirical application, the potential consumption gains from liberalizing the beef trade largely 
outweigh the losses linked to domestic production, and therefore the assumption is viable. The 
assumption that trade policies have no impact on domestic producer prices is also present in 
empirical applications of welfare consistent tariff aggregation (Bach and Martin 2001, Anderson 
2009 or Himics and Britz 2016).  
The proposed techniques are also rather data intensive, requiring information that might not yet be 
available at the global scale, such as domestic consumer prices at the tariff line level. The extension 
of the proposed aggregation methods to all sectors and regions of state-of-the art, large scale CGE 
models thus requires further advances in database developments. 
  
3.8 References 71 
 
 
3.8 References 
Anderson, J.E. (2009). Consistent trade policy aggregation. International Economic Review, 50: 903–
927.  
Anderson, J.E. and Neary, J.P. (2005). Measuring the Restrictiveness of International Trade Policy. 
The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Anderson, J.E., Wincoop, E. van, 2004. Trade Costs. J. Econ. Lit. 42, 691–751. 
Bchir, M.H., Jean, S., Laborde, D., 2006. Binding Overhang and Tariff-Cutting Formulas. Review of 
World Economics / Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 142, 207–232. 
Bach, C.F. and Martin, W. (2001). Would the right tariff aggregator for policy analysis please stand 
up? Journal of Policy Modelling, 23: 621–635.  
Beshkar, M., Bond, E.W., Rho, Y., 2015. Tariff binding and overhang: Theory and evidence. J. Int. 
Econ. 97, 1–13. doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2015.04.004 
Bouet, A., Decreux, Y., Fontagne, L., Jean, S. and Laborde, D. (2008). Assessing applied protection 
across the World. Review of International Economics, 16: 850–863. 
Britz W. and van der Mensbrugghe D (2016).  Reducing unwanted consequences of aggregation in 
large-scale economic models - A systematic empirical evaluation with the GTAP model. 
Economic Modelling, 2016, vol. 59, issue C, 463-472 
Britz W. and Witzke H.P. (2014). CAPRI Model Documentation 2014. Retrieved on September 26, 
2014 at: http://www.capri-model.org/docs/capri_documentation.pdf 
Bundesamt für Landwirtschaft (BLW) (2016). Agrarbericht 2016, Bundesamt für Landwirtschaft 
(BLW), Bern. Retrieved on January 13, 2016 at: www.agrarbericht.ch. 
Burrell, A., Ferrari, E., Gonzalez Mellado, A., Himics, M., Michalek, J., Shrestha, S., Van Doorslaer, B., 
2011. Potential EU-Mercosur Free Trade Agreement: Impact Assessment (No. EUR 25011 
EN), JRC Reference Reports. European Commission, Joint Research Centre. 
Burrell, A., Himics, M., Van Doorslaer, B., Ciaian, P., Shrestha, S., 2014. EU sugar policy: A sweet 
transition after 2015? (No. EUR 26530 EN), JRC Scientific and Policy Reports. JRC European 
Commission. 
Diewert, W.E., 1971. An Application of the Shephard Duality Theorem: A Generalized Leontief 
Production Function. J. Polit. Econ. 79, 481–507 
Egger, P., Francois, J., Manchin, M., Nelson, D., 2015. Non-tariff barriers, integration and the 
transatlantic economy. Econ. Policy 30, 539–584. doi:10.1093/epolic/eiv008 
Francois, J., Van Meijl, H., Van Tongeren, F., 2005. Trade liberalization in the Doha Development 
Round. Econ. Policy 20, 349–391. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0327.2005.00141.x 
French, S., 2016. The composition of trade flows and the aggregate effects of trade barriers. J. Int. 
Econ. 98, 114–137. doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2015.10.004 
Grant, J.H., Hertel, T.W. and Rutherford, T.F. (2007). Tariff line analysis of U.S. and international dairy 
protection. Agricultural Economics, 37: 271–280.  
de Gorter, H. and Kliauga, E. (2006). Reducing tariffs versus expanding tariff rate quotas. In 
Anderson, K, and Martin, W. (eds). Agricultural Trade Reform and the Doha Development 
Agenda. Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan; Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Himics, M. and Britz, W. (2016). Flexible and welfare-consistent tariff aggregation over exporter 
regions. Economic Modelling, 53: 375–387.  
Laborde, D., Martin, W., van der Mensbrugghe, D., 2017. Measuring the Impacts of Global Trade 
Reform with Optimal Aggregators of Distortions. Review of International Economics 25, 403–
425. doi:10.1111/roie.12271 
Listorti, G., Tonini, A., Kempen, M., & Adenäuer, M. (2013). How to implement WTO scenarios in 
simulation models: linking the TRIMAG tariff aggregation tool to CAPRI. 135th EAAE Seminar, 
Challenges for the Global Agricultural Trade Regime after Doha, Belgrade, Serbia, 28-30 
August. 
Loi A., Esposti R., Gentile M. et al. (2016). Policy Evaluation of Tariff Rate Quotas. Report mandated 
by the Swiss Federal Office of Agriculture. Areté srl, Bologna. 
72 3.8 References 
 
 
Möhring A., Mack G., Zimmermann A., Ferjani A., Schmidt A., Mann S. (2016) Agent-based modeling 
on a national scale – Experiences from SWISSland. Agroscope Science 30: 1-56. 
Muhammad, A, D’Souza A., Meade B., Micha R., and Mozaffarian D. (2017). The Influence of Income 
and Prices on Global Dietary Patterns by Country, Age, and Gender, ERR-225, U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, February 2017. 
Narayanan, B.G., Hertel, T.W. and Horridge, J.M. (2010). Disaggregated data and trade policy 
analysis: The value of linking partial and general equilibrium models. Economic Modelling 27: 
755–766.  
Pelikan, J., Britz, W., Hertel, T.W., 2015. Green Light for Green Agricultural Policies? An Analysis at 
Regional and Global Scales. J. Agric. Econ. 66, 1–19. doi:10.1111/1477-9552.12065 
Philippidis, G., Sanjuán, A.I., 2007. An Analysis of Mercosur’s Regional Trading Arrangements. World 
Econ. 30, 504–531. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9701.2007.01002.x 
Swiss-Impex, (2015). “Swiss-Impex Data for 2015.” Accessed 22 January 2016. https://www.swiss-
impex.admin.ch/index.xhtml. 
World Trade Organization (2012). Tariff Quota Administration Methods and Fill Rates 2002–2011 
  
Chapter 4: Does the current trade liberalization agenda contribute to  
greenhouse gas emission mitigation in agriculture?21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper contributes to the literature on the trade liberalization – climate change nexus by 
investigating the impact of the current free trade agenda of the European Union (EU) on the 
effectiveness of a possible greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction policy for its agricultural sector. For the 
analysis we implement scenarios with a carbon tax on non-CO2 emissions and trade liberalization 
both individually and combined in CAPRI, a global partial equilibrium model for agriculture. Scenario 
results indicate that the simulated trade liberalization by itself has only modest effects on 
agricultural GHG emissions by 2030. Pricing agricultural non-CO2 emissions in the EU triggers the 
adoption of mitigation technologies, which contributes to emission reductions. Emission leakage, 
however, partially offsets the EU emission savings as production increases in less emission-efficient 
regions in the world. The combination of agricultural trade liberalization and carbon pricing 
increases emission leakage and, therefore, further undermines global mitigation gains. Our results 
hinge on the key assumptions that future trade agreements between non-EU countries are not 
considered and that the climate actions are limited to the EU only. Despite these limitations we 
conclude that, from a global GHG mitigation perspective, trade agreements should address emission 
leakage, for instance by being conditional on participating nations adopting measures directed 
towards GHG mitigation. 
Keywords: climate change, agriculture, trade, emission leakage, European Union
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 This chapter has been published as Himics, M., Fellmann, T., Barreiro-Hurlé, J., Witzke, H.-P., Pérez 
Domínguez, I., Jansson, T., Weiss, F., (2018). Does the current trade liberalization agenda contribute to 
greenhouse gas emission mitigation in agriculture? Food Policy 76, 120–129. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The Paris Agreement on Climate Change legally entered into force on 4 November 2016. Specific 
modalities and procedures still have to be negotiated, but in general the Paris Agreement requires 
all Parties to take on ambitious efforts to mitigate GHG emissions and combat climate change 
through "nationally determined contributions" (NDCs). Enhanced international efforts to mitigate 
GHG emissions coincide with an increase in the number and scale of regional trade agreements. As 
the Doha Round of WTO negotiations stalls, large economies try to boost their economic growth by 
engaging in regional trade agreements with their main partners. Examples of such behavior include 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
negotiations, each covering a large share of global trade in goods and services. The EU follows a 
similar strategy and is increasingly engaged in regional trade negotiations (e.g. with Canada, USA or 
the Mercosur countries). 
The parallel development of trade liberalization and GHG reduction policies raises the question on 
their interplay. Whether a continuous liberalization of the agri-food markets contributes positively 
or negatively to emission mitigation efforts is a complex empirical question. The theoretical 
framework of environmental effects of trade-liberalization (Grossman and Krueger 1991) breaks 
down trade liberalization impacts on GHG emissions to the following three components: (1) the scale 
effect, i.e. liberalized trade boosts production and consumption, ceteris paribus increasing global 
GHG emissions; (2) the composition effect, i.e. facilitating trade also changes the composition of the 
goods produced and consumed, hence the net effect on global emissions depends on the emission 
intensity of the industries that gain from trade liberalization; and (3) the technique effect, i.e. 
liberalizing trade increases technological development and technology transfer unequivocally 
leading to a reduction in global emissions by promoting more emission-efficient technologies. 
Whether the net environmental impact of these three effects is positive or negative requires a 
quantitative analysis that weights the individual effects. Existing empirical evidence is controversial 
regarding the relative weight of each of the effects. Overall results move between two extremes: (i) 
trade liberalization and globalization leads to environmental degradation, especially in developing 
countries, and (ii) more liberalized trade leads to increased economic growth with positive spill-over 
effects on the environment (Copeland and Taylor 2004; Wiedmann et al. 2007; Peters and Hertwich 
2008; Huang et al. 2011; Peters et al. 2011). In any case, the mixed existing empirical evidence on 
the net aggregated effect of trade on global emissions hints towards the case specificity of impacts. 
Against this background, this paper contributes to the debate by providing a detailed analysis on 
how trade liberalization agreements may affect global GHG mitigation efforts for a specific sector 
(agriculture) and a specific country-group (the EU) with a highly developed economic and policy 
environment. Accordingly, the main research question we pose is: How does trade liberalization 
impact the effectiveness of GHG policies in the EU agricultural sector? Addressing this question, we 
also discuss if, and to what extent, trade liberalization shifts EU emissions to trade partners and 
other third countries or vice versa, and what the net impact on global emissions is. More specifically, 
we investigate this issue focusing on the impact of the agricultural provisions of the regional Free 
Trade Agreements (FTA) currently under negotiation between the EU and 3rd parties (including TTIP 
4.2 Methodology 75 
 
 
and EU-Mercosur), and a (still hypothetical) policy aiming at reducing (non-CO2) GHG emissions in EU 
agriculture enforced by means of a carbon tax22.  
The choice of the agricultural sector as the focus of our interest is motivated by its importance in 
non-CO2 (methane and nitrous oxide) GHG emissions, and by its important role in global food 
security. As key results we present production and GHG emission effects in the EU and globally, 
quantifying also emission leakage of trade liberalization when implemented in isolation or combined 
with climate policy. More specifically, we compare three scenarios against a business as usual 
reference for 2030. First we show how trade liberalization alone affects production and emissions, 
second we show how production and emissions are affected by a unilateral carbon tax for non-CO2 
emissions of EU agriculture, and last we show how the combination of the two adds up.  
4.2 Methodology 
For the analysis, we use the CAPRI (Common Agricultural Policy Regional Impact Analysis) modelling 
system (Britz and Witzke 2014). CAPRI is a large-scale, comparative static, partial equilibrium model 
focusing on agriculture and the primary processing sectors. CAPRI links a set of mathematical 
programming models of the EU regional agricultural supply to a global market model for agricultural 
commodities. The regional supply models follow a Positive Mathematical Programming (PMP) 
approach for simulating the profit maximizing behavior of representative farms for all EU regions. 
The regional supply models are linked with a sequential calibration approach to a global multi-
commodity model of the agricultural markets. International trade in the market model is 
implemented following the Armington assumption (Armington, 1969), i.e. imported goods are 
differentiated by place of origin, and consumer preferences for import demand are calibrated to a 
benchmark dataset (Britz and Witzke 2014).  
The standard market module in CAPRI also includes explicit Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ) functions. In this 
paper, however, the TRQ functions are converted into ad-valorem equivalent (AVE) tariff rates in 
order to simplify the scenario assumption. Representing the TRQs with their AVE equivalent tariff 
rates enables us to simply cut them by a given percentage, without going into assumptions on 
possible quota expansions or changes in in-quota or out-of-quota tariff rates. The drawback of the 
AVE representation of TRQs is that it might magnify trade liberalization impacts, as reaching the 
quota threshold does not anymore imply an immediate increase in tariff rates in the model (Himics 
and Britz 2016).  
With regard to GHG accounting, CAPRI endogenously calculates EU agricultural GHG emissions for 
nitrous oxide and methane based on the inputs and outputs of production activities. Following the 
IPCC guidelines (IPCC 2006), a Tier 2 approach is used for the calculation of activity-based emission 
factors, but where the respective information is missing a Tier 1 approach is applied (e.g. rice 
cultivation). Several specific technological (i.e. technical and management-based) GHG mitigation 
options for EU agriculture are considered, focusing on technological options that are already 
available or will likely be available at the simulation year 2030. Some of them are already used in EU 
agriculture (e.g. precision farming) but there is ample room for expansion to a much larger number 
of farms or production activities. The 14 mitigation technological options listed in Table 4.1 have 
                                                          
22
 A carbon tax refers to a tax attributed to a unit of emissions expressed in CO2 equivalents 
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been specifically considered for this paper and can be applied by EU farmers (for a detailed 
description of each technology see Pérez Domínguez et al. (2016). 
Table 4.1: Technological GHG mitigation options available for adoption by EU farmers 
Sector Technological mitigation options 
Livestock 
Anaerobic digestion at farm scale, Low nitrogen feed, Linseed as feed additive, 
Nitrate as feed additive, Vaccination against methanogenic bacteria in the rumen, 
and specific breeding programs to increase (i) milk yields of dairy cows and (ii) 
ruminant feed efficiency 
Crops 
Precision farming, Variable Rate Technology, Better timing of fertilization, 
Nitrification inhibitors, Rice measures, Fallowing histosols (organic soils), Increasing 
legume share on temporary grassland 
 
The underlying assumptions on implementation costs, cost savings, mitigation potential of the 
modelled technological mitigation options are mainly taken from the Greenhouse Gas and Air 
Pollution Interactions and Synergies (GAINS) database (GAINS 2013, 2015; Höglund-Isaksson et al. 
2013, 2016), and information collected within the AnimalChange project (Mottet et al. 2015). The 
level of production activities and the use of mitigation technologies are constrained by various 
factors, including land availability, fertilization requirements of the cropping systems versus organic 
nutrient availability, feed requirements in terms of dry matter, net energy, protein, and fiber for 
each animal. Moreover, production activities and decision making are also influenced by agricultural 
and environmental policy restrictions. A detailed description of the general calculation of agricultural 
emission inventories in CAPRI is given in Pérez Domínguez (2006), Leip et al. (2010) and Pérez 
Domínguez et al. (2012), and detailed description of the modelling approach related to the 
technological GHG mitigation options is presented in Van Doorslaer et al. (2015), Pérez Domínguez 
et al. (2016) and Fellmann et al. (2017).  
Two additional issues are worth mentioning. First, the calculation of emissions is not homogenous 
between the EU and the rest of the world. While the emissions of EU agriculture are calculated 
directly based on the IPCC guidelines on a per activity basis in the CAPRI supply model, GHG 
emissions for the rest of the world are estimated on a commodity basis (i.e. per kg of product) in the 
market model of CAPRI. Second, and linked to the different calculation approach, in previous 
analyses non-EU emission intensities were purely based on historic emission and production data 
from FAOSTAT. This did not allow the integration of technical trends, e.g. improved emission 
efficiency over time. As the projection year for our analysis is 2030, neglecting trends in emission 
intensities in non-EU countries could lead to an overestimation of emission leakage (Barreiro-Hurle 
et al. 2016). GHG emission intensity improvements in the rest of the world could be a result of 
climate or non-climate related developments. Improvements could, for example, come of developed 
countries allocating climate funding to the adoption of GHG mitigation technology or as a 
consequence of GHG mitigation policies being implemented and subsidized in non-EU regions. 
Additionally, emission mitigation may also spread irrespectively of climate change concerns, for 
example if fertilizer efficiency improves or if anaerobic digestion plants are installed for purely 
economic reasons. Global emission trends could also imply a deterioration of efficiency over time 
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due to composition effects.23 To incorporate the possibility of emission intensity changes over time, 
trend functions are estimated for the emission intensities in the rest of the world using IPCC Tier 1 
coefficients as prior information within a robust Bayesian estimation framework, combining data on 
production quantities and emission inventories from FAOSTAT (for more information on the 
approach see Jansson et al. 2010, 2014; Pérez Domínguez et al. 2016). 
4.3 Scenario assumptions 
Three policy scenarios are compared to a business as usual scenario (Reference): (i) a scenario that 
assumes an ambitious EU trade agenda to be fulfilled by 2030 (FTA scenario), (ii) a scenario for EU 
agriculture where a carbon tax of 50 EUR/t CO2 equivalents is applied to non-CO2 (i.e. methane and 
nitrous oxide) emissions of EU agricultural activities (EU Carbon Tax scenario), and (iii) a combination 
of the two. With the three scenarios we aim to disentangle the economic and environmental effects 
of trade liberalization and emission reduction policies, and shed some light on their interaction 
(Combined scenario). The simulation year for all scenarios is 2030 and in all scenarios farmers can 
voluntarily adopt technological mitigation options. The uptake of the mitigation technologies is 
driven by the model's profit maximization framework, and therefore farmers will only adopt the 
technologies if this improves farmers' competitiveness by reducing production costs. That may 
happen, for example, after the introduction of a carbon tax, which links the GHG emissions involved 
in the production of commodities to production costs.  
Reference scenario 2030 
The reference scenario assumes status quo policy as based on the information available mid-2016 
(e.g., abolishing the EU milk and sugar quotas) and only considers agricultural, environmental and 
trade policies that are already ratified. The reference scenario is calibrated to the European 
Commission’s outlook for agricultural markets and income (European Commission 2015), which itself 
is based on the OECD-FAO (2015) agricultural market outlook and gives medium-term projections up 
to the year 2025 in a consistent framework, using also external sources for the assumptions on 
macroeconomic developments (like GDP growth, exchange rates, world oil prices, and population 
growth). As the projection year for our analysis is 2030, we extrapolated and supplemented the 
European Commission’s projections with other information to arrive at the CAPRI reference scenario 
for the year 2030. A detailed description and discussion of the CAPRI calibration process is given in 
Himics et al. (2014). 
FTA scenario  
As the WTO negotiations seem to be stalled, the EU is actively seeking to engage in regional 
(bilateral) FTAs with the aim to boost economic growth. The EU's current trade agenda is filled with 
ongoing trade negotiations with its main trade partners and with countries in key geopolitical 
positions. In this paper we focus on those trade deals that are already under negotiation or likely to 
be negotiated in the mid-term. More precisely we take into account (i) two recently concluded but 
not yet adapted FTAs with Canada and Vietnam; (ii) major ongoing trade negotiations with the USA, 
                                                          
23
 For example: Assume that production of beef in one country is represented by a single value, but in reality production 
takes place both in dairy systems in one part of the country and with dedicated beef breeds in another. If the relative 
weights of those systems in overall beef production would change, the average emission intensity of “beef” would change 
too. 
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the Mercosur countries, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia; (iii) two FTAs with Australia 
and New-Zealand, which are likely to be initiated in the short-term. 
The varying roles agricultural policy plays in the different countries as well as food security and food 
safety issues related to foreign food commodities often make agriculture a stumbling block of trade 
negotiations. Although tariffs on traded goods generally have been decreasing in the last decade, 
tariffs and other border protection instruments on agri-food commodities are still relatively high. As 
concluded tariff schemes are not yet available for most of the FTAs considered, we apply a simplified 
and rather ambitious assumption on tariff reduction: full elimination of tariffs for most (non-
sensitive) agricultural commodities and a 50% (partial) tariff cut for the rest of the products. The 
selection of sensitive products follows the approach of Boulanger et al. (2016), and it is based on 
expert judgment supplemented by a selection algorithm focusing on foregone tariff revenues24.  
The agricultural sector is specifically subject to a multitude of sanitary and food safety regulations 
that often act as non-tariff barriers (NTMs) to trade. Although those NTMs are significant, we did not 
include the potential reduction of NTMs in our analysis, lacking an adequate database at the global 
scale with a detailed coverage of agri-food trade. In addition, Armington trade models, such as 
CAPRI, are not able to simulate emerging trade flows (those that currently are not observed but 
which are likely to become significant after trade liberalization). Both the lack of NTMs and the zero 
trade flow issue related to the Armington trade specification imply a possible underestimation of the 
trade liberalization impacts (Philippidis et al. 2013, 2014). On the other hand, the EU's trade agenda 
is modelled to be fulfilled in isolation, i.e. further trade agreements excluding the EU are not 
considered. This assumption probably leads to an overestimation of the efficiency of EU trade 
liberalization, as countervailing regional FTAs, or a future WTO agreement would likely lower the EU 
gains from this liberalized trade agenda.   
EU Carbon Tax scenario 
With respect to GHG emission mitigation obligations, the EU agricultural sector is currently included 
under the Effort Sharing Decision (ESD) within the "2020 Climate and Energy Package" of the EU 
(European Council 2009). In this ESD, the EU member states have GHG emission mitigation targets 
that are specific to individual countries but not to individual sectors. Up to now no explicit policy 
measures have been implemented to directly force the agriculture sector to reduce GHG emissions. 
This holds even though there are a number of measures targeting agriculture with objectives that 
also have climate benefits, such as the EU's Nitrates directive. However, recent scenario analyses 
indicate that reductions in agricultural emissions will be important to achieve global climate goals of 
limiting warming to 1.5 or 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels (Gernaat et al. 2015; 
Wollenberg et al. 2016). In this context the Paris Agreement puts the agricultural sector back on the 
agenda of emission mitigation. In this paper we investigate the possible impacts of a carbon tax to 
be put in place for agricultural non-CO2 emissions at EU level. We therefore put a tax of 50 EUR/t 
CO2 equivalents on methane and nitrous oxide emissions on EU agricultural activities.  
  
                                                          
24
 The selection of sensitive products has been carried out based on trade statistics at the tariff line level (HS6). 
The FTA scenario results in 98.5% of the tariff lines fully liberalized while the remaining 1.5% are subject to the 
reduced tariff cuts. 
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Combined scenario 
To measure possible interaction effects between trade and climate policies, we also construct a 
scenario combining the two policy options: 50 EUR/t CO2 equivalents tax on agricultural non-CO2 
emissions in the EU while at the same time taking into account a successful EU bilateral trade 
agenda. In section 4.5 the robustness of the Combined scenario is tested by varying the carbon tax 
level and the ambition of the EU's trade agenda. 
4.4 Scenario results 
In the following we concentrate on some key results with respect to EU production and related GHG 
emissions, and then quantify the impacts of the scenarios on global emissions. All scenario results 
are compared relative to the reference scenario in 2030. 
A successful completion of the EU's trade agenda alone already affects significantly the EU's 
agricultural non-CO2 GHG emissions, as in the FTA scenario emissions from agriculture are reduced 
by –1.6% in the EU. The imposed carbon tax on EU agricultural non-CO2 emissions achieves a much 
larger reduction of –9.5%, while a combination of the two policies further decreases agricultural 
emissions by an additional percentage point to –10.7%. 
The positive environmental impacts in the FTA scenario are mostly due to a reallocation effect of 
domestic agricultural supply in the EU to more competitive non-EU producers, i.e. the substitution of 
own domestic production with imports. Utilized agricultural area (UAA) in the EU is reduced 
significantly by almost 0.7 million ha, mainly due to a 6% decrease in cereals production. In parallel, 
set aside area and fallow land increases by almost 11%, thus further reducing arable land. The 
decrease in UAA and cereals production is accompanied by a 2% decrease in total nitrogen fertilizer 
application, which is a major source of agricultural nitrous oxide emissions. The EU beef meat herd, a 
main contributor of methane emissions from agriculture, is also decreasing by 2.4%, leading to a 
decrease in beef production of 1.6% (Figure 4.1). While EU poultry meat production is also 
decreasing by 2.6%, pork meat production slightly increases by 0.5%, however, the impact of these 
production developments on EU GHG emissions are minor as the emission intensity of pork and 
poultry is rather low compared to beef production activities.  
The negative supply effects of introducing a carbon tax on non-CO2 emissions from EU agriculture 
are also focused on the same sectors. However, as livestock production is more emission-intensive 
than crop production, the livestock sector is considerably more affected in the EU Carbon Tax 
scenario and the crop sector is less negatively affected than in the FTA scenario. Nonetheless, UAA is 
decreasing by 0.2 million ha in the EU Carbon tax scenario, and set aside and fallow land increases by 
almost 25%. Cereals production decreases by 2.3% compared to the reference scenario. 
Adjustments in livestock production are dominated by a reduction in ruminant herd sizes, with a -
5.5% decrease in the number of animals linked to beef production and a -2.8% decrease in herd sizes 
of sheep and goat fattening, resulting the in meat supply decreases of 3% and 2.7%, respectively. 
In a nutshell, in isolation both liberalizing trade and imposing a carbon tax reduces GHG emissions in 
the EU. However, while trade liberalization affects more EU crop production and related emissions, 
the carbon tax on EU agricultural non-CO2 emissions impacts more on the livestock sector. The 
decrease in GHG emissions in the Combined scenario is basically achieved by an accumulation of the 
supply effects observed in the EU Carbon Tax and FTA scenarios. Accordingly, the impacts in the crop 
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sector are generally more driven by the FTA and changes in the livestock sector more by the EU 
Carbon Tax. As a result, UAA declines by almost 1.6 million ha, cereals production decreases by 8% 
and set aside and fallow land increase by more than 32%. The EU beef cattle herd drops by almost 
9%, leading to a decrease in beef production of 5%, whereas animal numbers and production of 
sheep and goat meat decline by 4.5%.  
Figure 4.1: Percentage change in EU agricultural supply compared to the reference scenario (2030) 
 
Figure 4.2 shows how each of the modelled technological GHG mitigation options contribute to the 
EU emission reduction in the three policy scenarios. The reference scenario is not indicated because 
the mitigation technologies are projected not to be widely implemented in the absence of a policy 
incentive, as in most cases adoption is not profitable for the farmers. This holds also in the FTA 
scenario, where only the measure 'fallowing of histosols' (i.e. organic soils taken out of production) 
is applied beyond the reference scenario level and contributes with about 17% to the total EU 
emission reduction in the FTA scenario. The remaining 83% of the emission reduction is due to 
decreased production levels. However, the positive uptake of the fallowing of histosols measure is a 
mere side effect of the above mentioned general increase of set aside and fallow land. It is therefore 
triggered by the loss of competiveness in the crop sector in the FTA scenario, and not by decreasing 
marginal costs as a result of adopting the measure. The picture changes in the EU Carbon Tax 
scenario, where the technological mitigation options contribute to 42% of the total emission 
reduction. Introducing the carbon tax triggers an adjustment in the marginal cost of production of 
agricultural activities, linking those to the emissions. Mitigation technologies improve emission 
efficiency and therefore reduce marginal costs in the presence of a carbon tax. In this case the 
marginal cost of adopting a measure is lower than the expected reduction in marginal cost, farmers' 
adopt the measure. Among the available voluntary measures, anaerobic digestion and fallowing of 
histosols are the technologies that contribute most to the total mitigation in the EU Carbon Tax 
scenario (about 15% and 14%, respectively), followed by nitrogen as feed additive (4.4%), 
vaccination against methanogenic bacteria in the rumen (4%) and linseed as feed additive (2.7%). In 
the Combined scenario, technological mitigation options contribute to 38% of the total EU emission 
reduction. The share is lower than in the EU Carbon Tax scenario, but this is due to the higher total 
reduction in the Combined scenario, i.e. the absolute contribution per mitigation technology is quite 
similar in both scenarios, with the biggest changes compared to the EU Carbon Tax scenario being a 
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further increase of almost 0.6 million tons CO2 equivalents mitigated by the fallowing of histosols 
and 0.4 tons less by the use of linseed as feed additive.  
Figure 4.2: Contribution of the technological mitigation options to total EU emission reduction by 
2030 
 
* The mitigation effects linked to genetic improvement measures cannot be analyzed in isolation and are included in the 
mitigation achieved by changes in production. 
When investigating the interplay of trade and climate policies it is of major importance to assess net 
emission changes globally. The unilateral trade and climate reduction commitments of the EU in the 
simulated scenarios could in theory lead to positive or negative changes in global agricultural 
emissions, because production is shifted to more cost-efficient regions but these regions might be 
less efficient from a GHG emission perspective. Figure 4.3 shows that emission leakage indeed 
happens in our scenarios, as many non-EU countries increase their agricultural production to 
compensate for supply changes in the EU. The biggest increase in emissions is shown for Australia 
and New Zealand, where especially the cattle and sheep herds are increasing significantly in the EU 
Carbon Tax and Combined scenarios.  
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Figure 4.3: Global change in agricultural non-CO2 emissions (%-change compared to reference 
scenario) 
 
As shown in Figure 4.4, emission leakage is quite substantial in all three scenarios. In relative terms, 
emission leakage is highest in the FTA scenario, where the increase of emissions in the rest of the 
world more than offsets the reduction in the EU, leading to a situation where the FTA actually results 
in a net increase in total global emissions of almost 3.6 million tons CO2 equivalents (which 
translates into a net increase in global agricultural emissions of about 0.1%). Emission leakage is 
relatively less in the EU Carbon Tax scenario, where 21% of the EU mitigation effort is leaked to non-
EU countries, resulting in a net decrease in global agricultural emissions of 0.5%. Finally, emission 
leakage is again relatively higher in the Combined scenario (50%), resulting in a net decrease in total 
global agricultural emissions of 0.3%.  
Figure 4.4: EU emission mitigation and leakage as percentage of gross mitigation 
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Most of the relatively lower emission leakage in the EU Carbon Tax scenario can be attributed to the 
above mentioned higher share of mitigation technologies (42%) in EU emission mitigation. A higher 
rate of adoption of mitigation technologies improves the carbon efficiency of EU agricultural 
production, and therefore decreases the negative supply effect of the carbon tax. In parallel, EU 
import demand becomes relatively smaller, which decreases the leakage effect, under the 
assumption that the EU's trading partners are less emission efficient. Accordingly, as the share of 
mitigation technologies in EU mitigation is lower in the Combined (38%) and especially the FTA (17%) 
scenario, emission leakage is relatively higher in these two scenarios. As mentioned above, the rate 
of technology adoption in the EU Carbon Tax and Combined scenarios is triggered by the carbon tax, 
as for the adopting farmers the marginal cost of applying the technologies is lower than the marginal 
cost of paying the tax or reducing production levels. The absolute level of the contribution of the 
mitigation technologies is basically the same in the two scenarios with the carbon tax in place, i.e. 
the FTA in the Combined scenario does not trigger more technology adoption in the EU. Instead, the 
FTA results in a drop of EU producer prices, leading to additional EU production decreases which are 
substituted by more competitive imports from third countries, but as these countries have higher 
emission factors (i.e. higher emissions per kg produced), the net effect in EU emission mitigation is 
further diminished by emission leakage. In the scenario without trade liberalization, in addition to 
the effect of technology uptake, tariffs allow EU agriculture to continue being more competitive due 
to higher domestic prices.  
With respect to the sectoral economic welfare effects (i.e. only considering economic welfare linked 
to agricultural outputs, and not to other sectors or environmental externalities), our scenarios show 
that trade liberalization and the introduction of a carbon tax drive the results to different directions: 
the former puts a downward price pressure on EU agriculture, whereas the latter leads to the 
opposite effect and EU agricultural prices increase. The trade liberalization agenda of the EU leads to 
increasing consumer surplus in the FTA scenario (+12.3 billion Euros), as further opening up to 
international competition decreases EU food prices (Table 4.2). The impact on agricultural income in 
the EU is negative (-9.6 billion Euros) due to shrinking agricultural supply and lower producer prices. 
Conversely, the introduction of the carbon tax on non-CO2 emissions generates a decrease in 
consumer surplus of about 5.4 billion Euros due to food price increases. The corresponding increase 
in producer prices would lead to increasing agricultural income in terms of gross value added before 
taxes (+6 billion Euros). In the Combined scenario, the downward price pressure of the trade 
liberalization dominates, resulting mostly in decreasing agri-food prices and consequently in larger 
consumer surplus, with a parallel (albeit lower) decrease in agricultural income. 
Following a supply side implementation of the carbon tax, we account for the carbon tax directly 
under EU agricultural income. Assuming that farmers had to pay the full burden of the newly 
introduced carbon tax, EU agricultural income would decrease significantly in both scenarios 
involving a carbon tax, with a higher decrease in the Combined scenario (-13.6 billion Euros in the EU 
Carbon Tax scenario and -23.9 billion Euros in the Combined scenario). Avoiding the estimation of 
transaction costs related to monitoring agricultural emissions and collecting the tax from farmers, 
the carbon tax is added as a lump sum transfer to government revenues. Our partial equilibrium 
framework is not suitable for modelling possible options for redistributing that tax revenue back to 
economic agents. At least part of the tax revenue, however, could eventually be redistributed to 
farmers, e.g. by supporting the adoption of mitigation technologies, in order to further incentivize 
emission-efficient farming practices.  
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The profit of the processing industry is mostly affected by primary agricultural commodity prices: it 
either benefits from lower prices in the FTA scenario or is worse off due to increasing prices in the 
other scenarios. Tariff revenues increase in all scenarios mainly due to increased volumes of trade, 
taking into account that tariff cuts for sensitive products (whose trade contributes the most to total 
tariff revenues) are only partial. Tax payer costs of agricultural subsidies, that cover the costs of the 
Common Agricultural Policy, do not change significantly in any of the scenarios, which is partly due 
to the limited impacts on total agricultural supply in the EU, but also indicates that a significant part 
of the subsidies are decoupled from production.  
Table 4.2: Decomposition of welfare effects in the EU agricultural sector, 2030 
  
FTA EU Carbon Tax Combined 
  
Absolute (Billion EUR) and percentage difference 
to the reference scenario 
a. Consumer surplus 12.3 (0.06%) -5.4 (-0.03%) 7.8 (0.04%) 
b. Agricultural income  -9.6 (-4.53%) -13.6 (-6.44%) -23.9 (-11.26% 
 - excluding Carbon tax  -9.6 (-4.53%) 6.0 (2.82%) -4.6 (-2.15%) 
c. Profit of processing industry 0.7 (1.75%) -1.5 (-3.85%) -0.8 (-2.03%) 
d. Tariff revenues and TRQ rents 0.8 (12.9%) 0.3 (4.04%) 1.3 (19.93%) 
e. Tax payers' cost of agricultural subsidies -0.1 (-0.13%) -0.1 (-0.14%) -0.2 (-0.34%) 
f. Government revenue from Carbon tax n.a. 19.6 (n.a.) 19.3 (n.a.) 
 
Total welfare change (a + b + c + d – e + f)1 4.3 (0.02%) -0.7 (0%) 3.8 (0.02%) 
1 Total welfare effects linked to the EU agricultural sector, calculated as the sum of consumer surplus plus producer surplus (agricultural 
income and profits from the processing industry) plus tariff revenues minus taxpayer costs plus government revenue Carbon tax. 
 
4.5 Sensitivity analysis 
Tariff reduction in the FTA and Combined scenarios have been implemented in a simplified manner, 
using a full tariff elimination assumption on non-sensitive goods and a 50% tariff cut on sensitive 
ones. There is, however, a large uncertainty around the magnitude of the tariff cuts. For FTAs still 
under negotiation the final tariff schedules might lead to a less or more ambitious trade opening for 
the EU than those implemented in our scenarios. Similarly, the magnitude of a potential EU-wide 
carbon tax for agriculture is uncertain, as such a tax is currently not considered in the EU political 
discussions. Acknowledging the potentially significant impacts that the above uncertainties can have 
on simulated results, we provide a sensitivity analysis on the Combined scenario with alternative 
assumptions on trade liberalization and on the level of the carbon tax. By combining more and less 
ambitious trade liberalization assumptions with a higher and lower rate for the carbon tax, a total of 
four alternative scenarios are compared to the Combined scenario described in the previous sections 
(Table 4.3). 
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Table 4.3: Combined scenario assumptions for the sensitivity analysis 
 Trade liberalization 
  Less ambitious More ambitious 
Lower  
carbon tax 
LA_LT scenario 
25% tariff cut on sensitive products,  
50% tariff cut on non-sensitive products, 
25 EUR/t CO2 eq. carbon tax 
MA_LT scenario 
75% tariff cut on sensitive products, 
100% tariff cut on non-sensitive products, 
25 EUR/t CO2 eq. carbon tax: 
Higher  
carbon tax 
LA_HT scenario 
25% tariff cut on sensitive products,  
50% cut on non-sensitive goods, 
100 EUR/t CO2 eq. carbon tax 
MA_HT scenario 
75% tariff cut on sensitive products,  
100% tariff cut on non-sensitive goods, 
100 EUR/t CO2 eq. carbon tax  
 
The results of the sensitivity analysis confirm the main drivers of EU emission changes. The reduction 
in EU non-CO2 emissions is driven mainly by the introduction of a carbon tax on agriculture. 
Correspondingly, none of the lower carbon tax scenarios reaches a comparable level in emission 
savings to the Combined scenario. Even in the case of a more ambitious trade agenda, emission 
savings in EU agriculture hardly reach 25 million tonnes of CO2 equivalents. In contrast, doubling the 
carbon tax relative to the Combined scenario increases emission savings by more than 50%. 
Combining the higher carbon tax with a more ambitious trade agenda provides relatively small 
additional benefits in terms of emission savings, with only about 6 million tonnes of CO2 equivalents 
difference between MA_HT and LA_HT. The application of some technological mitigation options 
increases with an increasing carbon tax, but the larger part of the emission savings is attributed to 
the production effect (Annex Figure A 4.1).  
In the Combined scenario we observed that both trade liberalization and the introduction of a 
carbon tax contribute to increasing non-CO2 agricultural emissions in non-EU countries, due to a 
relatively emission-efficient EU agriculture and to shrinking EU agricultural supply. These tendencies 
are confirmed by the sensitivity analysis. A more ambitious liberalization combined with a higher 
carbon tax (MA_HT) increases emissions in third countries the most, with the FTAs being responsible 
for the lion share of the impacts (Annex Figure A 4.2). Accordingly, the driving forces for emission 
leakage are also confirmed by the sensitivity analysis (Annex Figure A 4.3 and Figure A 4.1). A more 
ambitious trade agenda would increase emission leakage at all levels of an EU carbon tax, and the 
lower carbon tax is not sufficient to offset the induced emission leakage to non-EU countries, with 
an emission leakage coefficient similar to the pure FTA scenario (123% in MA_LT vs. 151% in FTA). 
On the other hand, a higher carbon tax reduces EU emissions to such an extent that emission 
leakage under more ambitious trade liberalization only slightly increases (from 50% in Combined to 
65% in MA_HT). 
4.6 Discussion and conclusions 
Our findings provide some empirical evidence on a negative (and significant) effect of trade 
liberalization on GHG mitigation efforts in EU agriculture. The Combined scenario shows that the 
current EU trade liberalization agenda would undermine the global mitigation that could be achieved 
with unilateral measures in the EU25. Would the EU accomplish its trade liberalization agenda while 
                                                          
25
 Although we implement a specific carbon tax on agricultural non-CO2 emissions, the carbon tax can also 
mimic the operation of a larger policy package including possible elements of efforts for improved emission 
efficiency (e.g., farmers' education, cost compensation for the adoption of technological GHG mitigation 
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setting a sector specific mitigation policy for the agricultural sector this could more than double 
emission leakage rates (Figure 4.4). However, the combined impact of the simulated trade 
liberalization and EU carbon tax would still result in net mitigation of global agricultural non-CO2 
emissions (Figure 4.3). Contributing to the stream of literature examining the empirical 
measurement of the trade-liberalization – GHG emissions nexus, we conclude that trade 
liberalization in the agricultural sector by the EU does not lead to environmental gains. Regarding 
the interplay of trade and climate policy, we find that the negative impact on non-CO2 GHG 
emissions of trade liberalization is smaller than the positive emission impact of climate policy. 
However, the relative impact varies by region and commodity, which potentially allows designing a 
more targeted approach to avoid the contradicting impacts of both policies.  
With respect to unilateral mitigation efforts, our results on emission leakage are in line with the 
majority of empirical evidence in the literature (e.g. Lee et al. 2007; Herrero et al. 2016; and previous 
work with CAPRI in Pérez Dominguez et al. 2012, 2016; Van Doorslaer et al. 2015; Fellmann et al. 
2017), although some authors find that unilateral emission reduction policies can lead primarily to a 
loss in competitiveness rather than to significant emission leakage effects (Matoo and Subramanian 
2013).  
Regarding the trade-liberalization – GHG emissions nexus, our simulated trade-liberalization impacts 
on global mitigation efforts of agricultural non-CO2 emissions are negative. The negative net effect of 
the modelled FTAs on global agricultural GHG emissions is due to an increase in production in non-
EU countries with relatively high emission intensities (more GHG emissions per kg produced). In the 
scenarios with a successful EU FTA agenda in place, production increases are, for example, especially 
shown for Australia and New Zealand with respect to beef and sheep meat as well as dairy 
production. Both countries have generally more extensive production systems than the ones in the 
EU, which are on the one hand very competitive on the international markets, but, on the other 
hand, come along with higher emissions per kg produced. Therefore Australia and New Zealand 
substantially contribute to the simulated emission leakage effects, with more than 5.4 and 6.3 
million tons CO2 eq. in the FTA and the Combined scenario, respectively, compared to 0.6 million 
tons of CO2 eq. in the EU Carbon Tax scenario without a FTA in place. It has to be mentioned that our 
modelling approach is not able to decompose the total environmental impacts to scale, composition 
and technique effect. The modelling approach for non-EU emissions does not capture technology 
transfer or additional efforts in non-EU countries to increase emission efficiency. We rather focus on 
the scale and composition effects, as the Armington approach to trade covers the change in import 
demand patterns, and the partial equilibrium framework of CAPRI takes into account the supply side 
adjustments in agriculture and primary processing in great detail. 
As outlined in the literature, the extent of emission leakage and hence the net gain of national 
mitigation efforts for global GHG emission reduction depends significantly on the relative GHG 
efficiency (i.e. emissions per unit of output) of agriculture in the exporting countries compared to 
the importing country (Caro et al. 2014; Pérez Domínguez and Fellmann 2015; Scott and Barrett 
2015). Additional measures to assure that compensatory actions are taken for the specific 
product/origin combination most affected by trade liberalization would assure the integrity of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
measures) and even compulsory GHG mitigation measures (e.g. reduction targets). Thus the generalization of 
our results to a broader set of policies is to some extent possible, however, the welfare implications would 
vary depending on the policy instrument implemented.   
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climate change mitigation efforts of the EU. Although we do not go into a political economy 
discussion on the viability of the above policy options, our finding may support combining a 
unilateral EU carbon tax with other policy instruments (such as border tax adjustments) in order to 
prevent or reduce the leakage effect. However, border tax adjustments, such as tariffs on imports 
based on the emission intensity of their production could be in conflict with many objectives of the 
EU trade agenda. Moreover, border adjustment measures are often seen as an inappropriate and 
non-useful measure, especially in the context of WTO rules and due to potentially negative welfare 
effects in particular for developing countries (Frankel 2008; Stavins et al. 2014).  
In our analysis we do not calculate with possible regional FTAs outside the EU's trade agenda, or 
with a successful completion of the current WTO negotiation round. Therefore the gains from trade 
for the EU and for its FTA partners are probably overestimated. The impact of this assumption on 
simulated emission leakage effects is ambiguous, as the EU may manage to expand production (and 
related emissions) for commodities where it traditionally has an export position in global markets 
(e.g. dairy) while the opposite holds for commodities where imports may grow significantly (e.g. 
beef). In this context it has to be mentioned that in our analysis emissions from the transport sector 
are also not taken into account, which is a rapidly growing source of emissions itself with obvious 
linkages to increased international trade in goods. We concentrate on non-CO2 emissions (where 
agriculture is an important emitter) and we do not take into account CO2 emissions (or sinks) from 
the land use, land-use changes and forestry (LULUCF) sector. 
It has to be highlighted that the reported emission leakage impacts crucially depend on the 
estimated emission coefficients for the commodities produced in non-EU countries. As EU 
agriculture is assumed to be relatively emission efficient globally, the substitution of domestic EU 
production with less emission efficient imports offsets the emission savings in the EU, leading to 
emission leakage that can eventually result in a net increase in global emissions. While our approach 
for estimating emission factors for non-EU countries takes into account the changes in emission 
intensities over time (based on past trends), technological mitigation options are not specifically 
considered in the model outside the EU. Thus, changes in emission factors outside the EU are not 
model-endogenous (but rather fixed) in our comparative simulations. As our scenarios with the EU 
Carbon Tax show, the application of mitigation technologies contributes to the reduction of EU 
emissions from agriculture and at the same time moderates the negative supply effect on EU 
production, hence diminishing emission leakage effects. The lack of model-endogenous mitigation 
technologies in non-EU countries limits the validity of the simulated effects on emission leakage, but 
whether the leakage effects are over- or underestimated depends on the particular mix of emission 
intensity changes globally. It remains for further research to calculate emission factors for 
commodities produced in non-EU countries under different technological development options. 
Furthermore, we assume a unilateral climate action from the EU, which distorts relative carbon 
prices extremely in favor of non-EU countries. The resulting lower competitiveness of the EU 
agricultural sector on global markets probably adds to an overestimated impact on trade in our 
Combined scenario. Accordingly, the extent of emission leakage depends on the commitments other 
countries make regarding their contributions to the Paris Agreement. It remains to be seen how the 
global climate agreement will be put into action, but our scenario results show that multilateral 
commitments will be necessary not only in the light of emission leakage and global emission 
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mitigation but also with respect to minimizing distortions to agricultural competitiveness arising 
from unilateral emission mitigation obligations.  
Notwithstanding the above caveats, our paper provides an unambiguous message, as it points to the 
importance of the cross negotiation of free trade agreements together with the design of National 
Determined Contributions (NDCs) within the Paris Agreement, assuring that mitigation efforts are 
not undermined in sectors where trade is forecasted to increase the most. Depending on the relative 
development of the trading partners, the mitigation efforts could be partly funded by the developed 
party of the free trade agreement, by both parties or by the emitting party.  
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Figure A 4.1: Contribution of the technological mitigation options to total EU emission reduction by 
2030, sensitivity analysis results 
 
Figure A 4.2: Global change in agricultural non-CO2 emissions, sensitivity analysis results (%-change 
compared to reference scenario) 
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Figure A 4.3: EU emission mitigation and leakage as percentage of gross mitigation, sensitivity 
analysis results 
 
 
Figure A 4.4: Percentage change in EU agricultural supply compared to the reference scenario 
(2030), sensitivity analysis results 
 
 
